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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates gaps in the credible fear process within the asylum context and 
provides recommendations for improving the process. As the number of individuals who 
file credible fear and asylum applications rises, the specter of individuals filing meritless 
applications increases. Applications for protection filed by criminals, terrorists, and 
opportunists threaten U.S. national security and public safety, and weaken the integrity of 
the nation’s asylum system. This thesis explores how the flaws in the asylum and credible 
fear process should be addressed to minimize fraud and abuse in the system. The findings 
of this thesis are that frivolous applications are being filed, and that criminals and 
terrorists are gaming the system. The research also concludes that current safeguards 
insufficiently protect the nation after an individual’s asylum approval. The author 
recommends the formation of an Asylum Review Board to provide additional layers of 
protection after an individual’s asylum claim is approved. 
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During the summer of 2012, a major shift began in the number of undocumented 
individuals crossing from the Mexican border into the United States. While the number of 
individuals apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (hereafter referred to 
simply as CBP) and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereafter 
referred to simply as ICE) grew overall, the flow also included a significant increase in 
persons seeking asylum. During fiscal year (FY) 2013, 36,026 detainees requested a 
credible fear interview with an asylum officer to determine whether they were eligible to 
apply for asylum. The Asylum Division officers found 85.33 percent of the applicants 
had credible fear. During FY2014, the number of individuals asking for credible fear 
interviews continued to grow, reaching 59,941. The proportion who was granted credible 
fear declined to 70 percent of all cases. Once asylum officers determine an individual has 
a credible fear of persecution, they refer the individual to immigration court to apply for 
asylum. A grant of asylum ensures the applicant is able to remain indefinitely in the 
United States, work, and petition for family members to join them in the United States.  
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 235(b)(1)(B)(v) defines 
credible fear to mean that “there is a significant possibility, taking into account the 
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such 
other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum 
[under the INA section 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C section 125(b)(1)(B)(ii)].”1 The INA 
defines the term “alien” to mean any person not a citizen or national of the United 
States.2 Accordingly, the credible fear interview is an attempt to ascertain whether 
applicants have a fear of persecution if they return to their country of origin and whether 
their supporting claims are credible. In other words, is the applicant making truthful 
statements about the claimed fear and the reason for coming to the United States (U.S.). 
                                                 
1 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sections 235(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (v). See also, 8 U.S.C. section 
125(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
2 INA section 101(a)(3). See also, 8 U.S.C. section 1101(a)(3). 
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If the fear is genuine and relates to one of five grounds of persecution contained in U.S. 
law, then the applicant is eligible to apply for asylum. 
The challenge to the integrity of the asylum system begins with the detection of 
fraud in more than 70 percent of all credible fear and asylum cases. Applicants are 
examined several times, including at time of apprehension or when background and 
biometric checks expire before applications for asylum are approved. Fingerprint scans 
are valid for 15 months and if the application is not processed during those 15 months, 
new biometrics data must be collected.3 Electronic checks complement personal 
interviews as they may uncover individuals’ criminal history or association with 
terrorism. Yet, despite these checks, individuals with fraudulent claims or applicants with 
nefarious purposes may be granted asylum status.  
Once granted asylum, an asylum officer or immigration judge has the authority to 
terminate the case if fraud is discovered or an incorrect decision has been made.4 Yet, 
such reversals rare occur. Policies and procedures limit the value of the interviews for 
determining fraudulent claims and the design of the overall process allows applicants 
intent on abusing the system to circumvent the screen. Therefore, reforms are needed to 
identify unworthy applicants even after an application is approved and then to terminate 
these cases. 
This thesis recommends the establishment of an independent Asylum Review 
Board (ARB) with the authority to terminate asylum status of individuals who should not 
have been approved. The ARB should have the authority to terminate asylum approvals 
regardless of whether the cases were approved by the Asylum Division or in immigration 
court. The ARB should also have the authority to conduct additional checks and 
interviews. For instance, the ARB should periodically re-examine individuals who 
successfully obtained an asylum grant to determine if their asylum claim remains viable. 
The monitoring should include efforts to determine if the individual returned to the 
country where persecution was originally alleged, which would trigger a concern about 
                                                 
3 “Background Checks,” March 30, 2011, http://www.uscis.gov/adoption/background-checks. 
4 INA section 208(c)(2); See also, 8 C.F.R., section 208.24. 
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the validity of the initial claim. If the ARB officer determines that individual asylees 
violated their immigration status or should not have been approved asylum status, the 
officer should be able to revoke their asylum status and institute removal procedures.  
Although these recommendations may affect the current jurisdictional limits of 
the Asylum Division and immigration courts, an Asylum Review Board would have 
substantial benefits. It would attack the high level of fraud in the credible fear and asylum 
process and ensure the integrity of the asylum system overall through curtailing the 
number of fraudulent filings while raising the proportion of all claims that protect 
individuals from genuine persecution. System integrity would reduce risks to homeland 
security through limiting threats from illegal entry and would enhance the ability of the 
nation to communicate its humanitarian values to the world. 
 xviii
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Each year, countless economic migrants make their way to the United States. The 
number of individuals who arrive at the southwest border illegally has steadily grown 
from fiscal year (FY) 2009 to late 2014. At the end of FY2014, 479,371 individuals were 
apprehended at the southwest border. 
These apprehensions represent an upward trend of more than 63 percent from 
2011, which saw 327,577 illegal individuals apprehended at the southwest border.1 
Among these migrants seeking a better life have been an increasing number of 
individuals who also claim to be fleeing violence and persecution. In FY2009, 5,523 
individuals applied for protection with the Asylum Division after being apprehended, 
compared to 33,283 filings in FY2013. During the first three quarters of FY2014, which 
offer the latest available figures, the Asylum Division received 36,334 new filings.2 The 
higher numbers and the complex reasons for the migration have pushed the asylum 
process, and especially credible fear determinations, to the forefront of national attention 
and congressional inquiries. 
This thesis examines the credible fear process in the context of asylum 
proceedings related specifically to claims made by those attempting to cross the U.S. 
southwest border illegally. For current purposes, the Southwest border comprises the land 
spanning approximately 2,000 miles from the Gulf of Mexico off the Texas coast, across 
New Mexico and Arizona, to the Pacific Coast in California. Border crossings, of course, 
are only part of the total attempts to reach safety, and the United States is only one of the 
countries experiencing an expanding influx. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported for 2013 that the United States processed 263,662 refugees 
                                                 
1 “United States Border Patrol, Sector Profile—Fiscal Year 2014 (Oct. 1st through Sept. 30th),” 2011, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S. Border Patrol Fiscal Year 2011 Sector Profile.pdf.  
2 “Credible Fear Workload Report Summary FY 2014 Total Caseload,” July 31, 2014, http://www. 
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Credible_Fear_and_Reasonable_Fear_FY14_Q3.pdf.  
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and had 84,343 asylum claims pending.3 In contrast, Canada accepted 14,397 asylum 
applications in that year and the 22 European Union countries registered 398,200 asylum 
seekers. Applications overall increased 32 percent from the previous year and reflect a 
general upward trend.4 
While most migrants come to the United States for a better economic life and 
personal safety, others intend to commit crimes or acts of terrorism. Despite their 
different motives, however, those who attempt to enter the United States illegally share 
the need to circumvent immigration laws. The desire to enter the United States is 
overshadowed by a fear of being caught by border or immigration officials. They attempt 
to enter surreptitiously, some with valid identification, such as birth certificates or 
national identification cards, while others, perhaps the majority, arrive at the border with 
no identification. While some slip through undetected, others do not reach their 
destination and are apprehended by U.S. Customs Border Protection (CBP).  
Apprehension at the time of illegal entry begins the expedited removal process. 
After capturing biometric information, such as a photo, fingerprints, and signature of 
applicants over the age of 14, initial questioning focuses on the individuals’ background 
and reason for having entered the United States illegally. CBP transfers the apprehended 
persons to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which administratively 
detains and returns them to their countries of origin. For most apprehended illegal 
migrants, this expedited removal process does not require judicial review.  
During any stage of the expedited removal process, individuals may claim fear of 
return to their countries. This expression of fear begins the “credible fear” process and 
halts the removal process, essentially stopping the deportation of individuals. At that 
point, an asylum officer from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
will schedule an interview with the applicants to determine whether the individuals are 
eligible for an asylum hearing before an immigration judge.  
                                                 
3 “UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2013: Statistical Annexes,” 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/54cf9bc 
29.html.  
4 “Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2013,” 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/5329b15 
a9.html.  
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The entire process may be riddled with fraud. For example, between December 
2013 and February 2014, the House Judiciary Committee claimed that more than 70 
percent of credible fear applications are fraudulent.5 Fraud in an asylum application refers 
to an intentional and knowing deception, either through providing false testimony or 
evidence. Fraudulent and frivolous applications subject the individual applicant to 
permanent restrictions on their eligibility to file for future immigration benefits, fines, or 
even imprisonment. Still thousands routinely risk the penalties for a chance to gain 
residence in the United States.  
In practice, however, the risk of detection is not very high. The Asylum Division 
and the immigration courts rarely require their officers to go back to examine and then 
terminate approved asylum claims. Few checks occur to verify applicants’ claims about 
events related to their persecution claims and, when contradictions emerge during an 
interview, asylum officers have few legally sufficient means to challenge the applicants’ 
credibility. Applicants may feel they have nothing to lose by submitting frivolous claims 
to gain entry to the United States. 
The process itself also may enable applicants to misrepresent facts or events, or 
submit falsified documentary evidence. Asylum officers often need to consider instances 
in which genuine asylum seekers—who have bonafide claims of persecution—
misrepresent their identities to escape their persecutors. Bonafide asylum seekers, for 
instance, may present false documentation or tell false stories on how they escaped in 
order to avoid repercussions to their families and friends still at home. Fraud may be a 
“built in” part of the experience of asylum. Certainly, during some of the worst 
experiences of persecution in 20th century history, fraud was a means to an end as 
hundreds of thousands fled Nazi and communist oppression. 
Faced with this reality, the asylum process “excuses” certain misrepresentations 
that are immaterial to the heart of an applicant’s claim. Yet, without other ways to 
monitor the validity of claims, these misrepresentations also offer opportunities for 
malafide applicants to submit credible fear and asylum applications and gain permanent 
                                                 
5 “Press Release, House Judiciary Committee Asks GAO to Investigate Cost of Asylum Fraud to 
Taxpayers,” February 11, 2014, http://goodlatte.house.gov/press_releases/496.  
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residence in the United States. Fraud is certainly nearly always present in cases in which 
criminals or terrorists file applications. A 2002 Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
study on benefit fraud found that fraud was pervasive and routinely used in furtherance of 
criminal activities or those who threatened the national security of the United States.6 
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of information on whether credible fear applicants 
have criminal records or commit crimes once they have been granted asylum. Among all 
persons charged with criminal immigration offenses, 92 percent entered the country 
illegally.7 Yet, these statistical associations do not pinpoint the experiences of the tens of 
thousands of individuals who seek asylum. Connections between crime, terrorism and 
fraudulently filed asylum claims are typically uncovered looking back on the cases that 
have proven noteworthy because of the harm caused by the individual asylum recipient.8 
For instance, scholars long have observed the link between “international terrorism” and 
“illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms, trafficking, and illegal movement.”9 The 
degree of harm that may result even from these relatively infrequent cases, however, 
support an urgent need to review and reform the existing asylum and credible fear 
process.  
1. Key Considerations and Assumptions 
The credible fear process is a screening process to ensure that meritorious 
applicants are not returned to countries in which they would be at risk of being 
persecuted or tortured. The applicants must show “a significant possibility” that they will 
be found credible in “a full hearing before an immigration judge that he or she has been 
                                                 
6 United States General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed 
to Address Problems (GAO-02-66) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2002), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/233515.pdf.  
7 Mark Motivans, Immigration Offenders in the Federal Justice System, 2010 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/iofjs10.pdf. 
8 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2004), 72. 
9 Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links 
between Terrorism and Criminality,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 12 (2007): 1095–107, doi: 
10.1080/10576100701670870. 
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persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution or harm on account of his or her 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion if 
returned to his or her country.”10 Accordingly, applicants do not need to present 
corroborating evidence because asylum officers rely on the oral testimony of the 
applicants. When the applicants connect their fear and harm to one of the five enumerated 
grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion) and the motivation of the persecutor, the asylum officer will refer the case to an 
immigration judge. Upon establishing credible fear, the applicants may be released on 
bond. The applicant, or usually a family member already resident in the United States, 
will pay the bond money for release from detention. The applicant must then return for a 
hearing in immigration court during which he or she has an opportunity to present the 
asylum claim in more detail. 
Applicants’ testimonial narrative during this process is crucial because it provides 
the evidentiary basis for applicants to prove they have a fear of persecution. An 
unintended effect of the expedited removal process, however, is that as applicants are 
detained together in groups, their stories of fear of harm begin to share similarities. For 
instance, applicants from China have claims of forced abortions, religious persecution, or 
political opinions, whereas applicants from Mexico, South, Central, and Latin America 
often present claims based on general violence, belonging to a particular social group, 
and political opinion. The expedited removal process itself creates an environment that 
fosters the exchange of information among applicants and provides them with similar 
narratives.  
The clustering of shared narrative themes, however, may point to patterns of 
fraudulent claims. Recent applicants from Mexico and Central American countries, for 
example, are certainly driven to come to the United States because of instability and 
violence in their home countries. Their problems arise from a combination of weak local 
governments, high poverty rates, violent drug cartels battling each other for regional 
                                                 
10 “Lesson Plan Overview—Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate Officer 
Training Asylum Division Officer Training Course—Credible Fear,” 1–47, February 28, 2014, http:// 
cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-of-persecution-and-torture.pdf.  
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dominance, and self-defense forces that aggressively seize control of towns.11 Crime, 
general violence, or unrest, however, are not grounds for protection under U.S. asylum 
laws because the fear is generally unconnected to one of the five grounds upon which 
asylum may be used as a mechanism to protect the individual. 
Applicants’ narratives also change in patterned ways during the application 
process. Close to 90 percent of recent credible fear applicants referred to crime as the 
basis for their claim. Yet, during their first immigration court hearing, they expressed a 
fear of returning to their countries for political reasons.12 A change in the narrative in 
predictable ways may indicate that the applicants’ stories may not be truthful and are 
changed to meet the asylum criteria once they are informed about and coached on what to 
say before an immigration judge.  
2. Arguments 
Statistics show that most individuals in expedited removal proceedings who claim 
fear of return will be found to have established credible fear. Illegal entrants with 
successful credible fear determinations are referred to immigration court where they may 
apply for asylum. While a successful credible fear interview should not mean that a grant 
of asylum is automatic, statistics show that most asylum applications are approved at the 
immigration court stage.13 After one year of having had their asylum application 
approved, applicants may apply for lawful permanent residence (LPR), or more 
commonly known as “the green card.” The credible fear process, therefore, is an easily 
exploitable pathway to permanent residency in the United States.  
As discussed more fully in subsequent sections, the majority of credible fear 
applicants misrepresents or exaggerates their claim of persecution to remain in the United 
                                                 
11 Alex Gore, “Thousands of Armed Vigilantes Takeover Mexican Town, Arrest Police and Shoot at 
Tourists after ‘Commander’ Is Killed and Dumped in the Street,” Mail Online, March 28, 2013, http:// 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2300381/Vigilantes-seize-town-Mexico-shoot-tourists-commander-
killed.html.  
12 Jim Forsyth, “The Vast Majority of Central American Immigrant Children Are Appearing for 
Immigration Hearings,” News Radio 1200 WOAI, October 20, 2014, http://www.woai.com/articles/woai-
local-news-sponsored-by-five-119078/the-vast-majority-of-central-american-12881005/.  
13 “Relief Granted by Immigration Judges As of December 2014,” December 2014, http://trac. 
syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_relief.php.  
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States for economic reasons, personal reasons, such as joining family members, who 
already reside in the United States, or simply to avoid being detected as criminals or 
terrorists. With a steady increase in the size of the flow across the southwest border, the 
credible fear process has been well publicized in the media. As the public became aware 
of the credible fear process, public support for humanitarian relief, such as credible fear 
and asylum, has waned. A change in the credible fear process and the asylum process 
would re-establish public confidence in the system and should reduce the exploitation of 
the process by applicants who have no legal basis to seek asylum.  
3. Limits of the Research  
Applicants’ credible fear claims are evaluated using several criteria. One of the 
most important is whether the applicant has a fear of torture if returned to the country of 
origin. The focus of this thesis, however, is limited to the credible fear process in 
expedited removal proceedings as it relates to applicants’ claims for asylum. The 
discussion also focuses only on the adult population in the credible fear and asylum 
context, despite the large number of undocumented minors involved the migratory flow. 
U.S. policy is not to place unaccompanied minors into the expedited removal process 
except when the minors had been previously removed from the United States, or if they 
have been convicted of or involved in criminal activity.14 The Asylum Division has 
initial jurisdiction over asylum claims filed by unaccompanied minor children who are 
apprehended by CBP, which has the effect that these cases effectively bypass the 
immigration court.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Although the detained immigration population undergoes biographical and 
biometric screening, which entails analyzing photos, fingerprints, and signatures against a 
host of automated system tools, the credible fear and asylum processes provide 
insufficient safeguards in determining whether individuals merit asylum status. When 
fraud indicators are not confirmed by biographical and biometric screening, the 
                                                 
14 Paul Virtue, Unaccompanied Minors Subject to Expedited Removal, Memorandum to Management 
Team (Washington, DC: INS Office of Programs, 1997). 
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mechanism to detect fraud relies on the expertise of the interviewing officer. However, 
without the luxury of time, coupled with overcrowded detention facilities and large 
number of applicants, the tendency is to decide that the applicants need protection. The 
process is flawed and fosters misrepresentation. It attracts criminals and opportunists, and 
may even encourage individuals with ties to terrorism to cross the southwest border 
illegally. The high number of people who avail themselves of the credible fear process 
erodes the confidence of the public in the asylum system, undermines the humanitarian 
aspects of the process, and creates loopholes in the nation’s national security objectives. 
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions, (1) what are the weaknesses in the 
asylum and credible fear processes that need to be addressed to mitigate fraud and abuse 
in the system, and (2) what solutions and recommendations would minimize these gaps. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF INTENT 
This thesis examines the credible fear process within the asylum context. It is the 
product of 16 months of research that began in September 2013 and ended in February 
2014, and includes a review and analysis of legislation; statutory, regulatory rules, and 
legal decisions, immigration policies, and available literature on the credible fear process. 
Empirical data and statistics that pertain to asylum seekers, illegal entrants, and national 
security matters, and information gleaned from Department of Homeland Security 
(hereafter referred to simply as DHS), individual agencies (USCIS, ICE, and CBP), the 
Executive Office of Immigration Review (hereafter referred to simply as EOIR), reports 
from the Pew Research Study, the Transactional Records Access Clearing House (TRAC) 
Immigration Project University of Syracuse, the Homeland Security Digital Library 
(HSDL), U.S. congressional testimonies, U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
reports, media articles and reports, legal journals and review articles support this thesis.  
The primary intent of this thesis is to provide solutions and recommendations to 
overcome inherent flaws in the asylum and credible fear process and thereby strengthen 
the nation’s immigration system. An improved process will restore public trust in the 
system.  
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the United States is not party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees, it ratified the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees on November 
1, 1968 and the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment on October 21, 1994.15 For its asylum and refugee laws, the 
United States draws heavily from the United Nations treaties, and statutory, regulatory, 
and case law, as it relates to asylum and refugee law. Throughout much of its history, 
U.S. immigration law has adapted to broad shifts in the composition and patterns of 
global migration flows. It has also reflected contentious political battles involving both 
domestic and international interests. The legal frameworks for asylum and credible fear 
processes have and remain part of this tumultuous history.16  
1. Origins and Implications of the Credible Fear Process 
On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Public Law 104–208, 110 
Stat. 3009.17 IIRIRA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and had a 
wide-reaching impact on how the United States handles immigration.18 IIRIRA changed 
the treatment of illegal aliens at the border, the process of removal from the United 
States, and the adjudication of asylum cases.  
IIRAIRA created new grounds of exclusion aimed to alleviate a backlog of 
asylum cases. Prior to the passage of IIRIRA, aliens who expressed a fear of persecution 
at the time of admission at a U.S. port of entry, or at the time of apprehension upon entry 
                                                 
15 “State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or the 1967 Protocol as 
of September 2012,” accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/open 
docpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=50518a402; “Chapter V, Refugees and Stateless Persons, Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, Participant and Accession/Succession List. January 31, 1967,” accessed January 21, 
2014, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=V-5&cha 
pter=5&lang=en; “Chapter IV, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. December 10, 1984,” accessed January 21, 2014, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&%3Blang=en. 
16 INA, sections 235(b)(1)(A) & (B). 
17 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. section 1101, 
Pub. Law No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 309 (1996), codified at 8 U.S.C. section 1101. INA section 235(b)(1)(A) 
and 8 C.F.R. section 235.3. 
18 IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, 1996. 
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into the United States without proper authorization, were scheduled with an immigration 
judge within the Department of Justice (DOJ) to directly present their claim of asylum. 
IIRIRA changed this process and created the expedited removal process that became 
effective on April 1, 1997. With the enactment of IIRIRA, the Attorney General gained 
the authority to remove expeditiously an individual who engaged in misrepresentation or 
fraud, lacked proper documentation, or who was otherwise found inadmissible at the time 
of entry. IIRAIRA created credible fear provisions.19 When individuals express a fear of 
returning to their countries of origin, their cases are referred to asylum officers for a 
screening interview to determine whether the individuals possess a credible fear of 
persecution.  
Prior to April 1, 1997, aliens held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation 
could request judicial review of the deportation order through habeas corpus proceedings 
under INA section 106, which would effectively stall their deportation. Aliens may 
challenge detention as unlawful in habeas corpus proceedings, which are independent 
from the deportation hearings, when there are “good reasons to believe” that they are 
unlikely to be removed. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court 
held that it was unlikely that Mr. Zadvyadas would be removed because no other country 
would accept Mr. Zadvyada as he was born in Germany in a displaced persons’ camp to 
his Lithuanian parents.20 IIRIRA repealed section 106 and added Section 242(g) of the 
INA to IIRIRA. Section 242(g) was later amended by the Real ID Act. Section 242(g) 
shifts credible fear claims away from the courts and gave exclusive jurisdiction to the 
Attorney General to exercise deportation authority previously reserved for immigration 
judges.21  
2. Arguments Surrounding the Credible Fear Process 
In the six months after the passage of IIRAIRA, and the creation of the credible 
fear process, the legal community organized to oppose the law, noting an 80 percent 
                                                 
19 IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, 1996. 
20 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
21 INA section 242(g). 
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approval rate, abusive behavior by former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
inspectors, and deficiencies in the processing of cases.22 Although the INS ceased to exist 
on March 1, 2003, and the reorganization of its functions are now distributed between 
USCIS, CBP, and ICE, concerns over the program continue.23 Recently, many applicants 
go straight to the ports of entry (POE) to request credible fear interviews without 
attempting to enter the United States illegally, essentially “turning themselves in” to U.S. 
immigration authorities.  
The pre-9/11 legal immigration community widely opposed IIRAIRA, the 
expedited removal procedure, and the credible fear process because many believe they 
would effectively close the door to a generous immigration system.24 Despite these 
qualms, however, USCIS continues to provide information to the public about the 
credible fear process and other immigration benefits to would-be applicants on its official 
website, maintains a question and answer page that describes the credible fear process, 
and explains in detail how to apply for credible fear.25 Detainees also have access to 
information that explains the expedited removal process.26 
After 9/11, the literature focused on the possibility of terrorists crossing into the 
United States illegally from Mexico. For instance, in February 2005, Alan Eisner, a 
former Reuter’s journalist and pro-Israeli advocate, reported for the UT San Diego that 
thousands were illegally crossing the border every day and among them could be drug 
                                                 
22 Charles Wheeler, Mary McClenahan, and Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc, “Credible Fear 
Report,” AILA, October 29, 1997, http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=13120; Melvyn L. Cantor, 
Tracy M. Flynn, and Eleanor Acer, “Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,” 
Human Rights First, August 1999, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/pb_spec_ 
03.pdf. 
23 “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” accessed January 27, 2014, http://www.dhs. 
gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 
24 Wade Graham, “Masters of the Game. How the U.S. Protects the Traffic in Cheap Mexican Labor,” 
Harper’s Magazine Foundation, Harper’s Magazine 293, no. 1754 (1996), http://www.justice.gov/oig/ 
special/9807/mastgm1.htm. 




gangs and smuggled.27 Likewise, in November 2005, Jon Doughtery, a World Net Daily 
contributor, reported that U.S. immigration authorities had apprehended illegal aliens 
from countries with known terrorists links or from areas in which terrorists operated.28 
Paul Williams, a former FBI consultant and journalist, for instance, argued that drug 
trafficking gangs were possibly involved in helping Al Qaeda explore plans to smuggle 
nuclear weapons across the U.S.-Mexico border.29  
More recent arguments show that the current system was not created to withstand 
the large number of illegal migrants requesting credible fear interviews and much less 
designed to identify frivolous. Additionally, many applicants do not intend to defraud the 
asylum system, but their reasons for seeking protection have no necessary nexus to one of 
the five grounds under which a genuine fear must occur. Damien Cave of the New York 
Times describes a recent example of the complexities. In “A Civil Servant in Mexico 
Tests U.S. on Asylum,” Cave describes a case in which a Mexican official gave a letter to 
a woman so that she could go to the United States and apply for asylum. Her letter 
describes that gangs are shooting at her house and that she fears being shot or killed.30 
However, what the author of the article, the Mexican official who wrote the letter, and the 
woman who applied for asylum are seemingly unaware of is that asylum applicants do 
not need a note or a letter from their persecutors. Moreover, the woman may find herself 
caught up in the U.S. legal system because her fear is based not on one of the five 
grounds (religion, race, nationality, political opinion, or social group). Her case is 
representative of many applicants who claim fear for their safety but who do not meet the 
criteria under U.S. law for receiving protection through the asylum system.  
                                                 
27 Alan Elsner, “Non-Mexican Illegal Aliens a U.S. Security Headache,” U-T San Diego, February 4, 
2005, http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/mexico/tijuana/20050204-0912-security-border.html.  
28 Jon Dougherty, “Lawmaker: Terror War Spilling across Border,” WND, November 16, 2005, 
http://www.wnd.com/2005/11/33406/. 
29 Paul L. Williams, The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, and the 
Coming Apocalypse (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). 




The credible fear process has been and continues to be contentious. Although the 
system is flawed, it needs to continue to offer protection to those who must flee the 
persecution that pervades many countries. However, to remain viable, the system needs 
new avenues to detect fraud and discourage applicants from filing frivolous claims.  
E. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS  
The first chapter provides the reader with a brief introduction into the topic of the 
thesis. It further aims to address the goal of the thesis and the significance of the research. 
It briefly sets out the methodology of the research and structure of the thesis. The reader 
is introduced to the credible fear process and the literature surrounding the asylum and 
credible fear process. The second chapter provides the reader with a comprehensive 
background on asylum and credible fear. In this chapter, the reader learns the definitions 
and the intricacies of the process, including evidence and data in support of why a change 
in policy is needed. The third chapter is an in-depth discussion of the current situation in 
the asylum and credible fear process. It also provides findings on fraud and on the 
criminals and terrorists that attempt to exploit the credible fear and the asylum process. 
The last chapter provides recommendations.  
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II. DISCUSSION OF CREDIBLE FEAR PROCESS 
This first section of this chapter provides a deeper background discussion of the 
credible fear process. From the outset, it is important to clarify the term “credible fear,” 
which is a term of art. This section describes the purpose and structure of a credible fear 
interview, including what generally occurs during the interview and the types of 
questions an individual may be asked to ascertain fear. It also covers the five grounds that 
provide protection under U.S. asylum law and how the asylum officer determines 
credibility, including what constitutes material as compared to innocuous 
misrepresentation. Additionally, certain common terms used in this process, for example 
“general violence” and “de novo hearing,” are reviewed. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the demographic profile of asylum seekers and a brief description of the 
government agencies involved in the credible fear process. 
A. CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION 
U.S. refugee and asylum laws are complex. The question of whether an applicant 
fears remaining or returning to their home country or last place of residence is firmly 
embraced in U.S. refugee and asylum laws. A proper adjudication of a credible fear claim 
must draw on human rights treaties, statutes, regulations, case laws, interpretation of 
policy memorandums, and an understanding of the political and social conditions of the 
various countries that migrants behind.31  
As already defined above, the term “alien” means an individual who is not a 
citizen or national of the United States. The United Nations identifies migrants as persons 
who voluntarily or involuntarily move to another country to improve their material or 
social prospects (i.e., economic migrants or temporary migrant workers).32 Migrants are 
treated very differently under U.S. law depending on a variety of circumstances. A 
significant difference between a refugee and an asylum seeker, for instance, is that a 
                                                 
31 “Asylum Division Training Programs,” March 5, 2012, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/ 
refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-division-training-programs.  
32 “Key Migration Terms,” 2011, https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-
migration-terms-1.html. 
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refugee is outside of the United States when they seek protection while an asylum seeker 
has already crossed the border into the United States.33 Migrants who may not be 
admissible to the United States are placed in expedited removal proceedings.34  
Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the INA provides that if the aliens indicate an intention to 
apply for asylum or expresses fear of persecution or return to their countries, the aliens 
shall be scheduled for an interview with an asylum officer to establish a credible fear of 
persecution or torture.35 Accordingly, the credible fear process is a way for the asylum 
officer to gather information from the aliens about their fear and determine whether the 
aliens might be eligible for asylum.  
B. A SCREENING INTERVIEW 
INA section 235(b)(1)(B)(v) defines credible fear to mean that “there is a 
significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the 
alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that 
the alien could establish eligibility for asylum [under the INA].”36 The statute, therefore, 
requires the aliens to testify truthfully about the events that lead them to leave their 
countries and that the events demonstrate that they were persecuted or may be persecuted 
if returned to their home countries. If the applicant’s testimony meets this threshold 
criterion, he or she is eligible to apply for asylum. However, rather than filing the asylum 
claim with the asylum officer, the applicants will be scheduled for a hearing with an 
immigration judge because they are in expedited removal proceedings.37 The individual 
hearing on the merits of the case is preceded by one or more master calendar hearings. 
                                                 
33 “Refugees & Asylum,” September 1, 2011, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum.  
34 Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem, Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens (CRS 
Order Code RL33109) (Washington, DC: Congressional Information Service, 2005), http://fpc.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/54512.pdf. 
35 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. section 1101, 
Pub. Law No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 309 (1996), codified at 8 U.S.C. section 1101. INA section 235(b)(1)(A) 
and 8 C.F.R. section 235.3.  
36 “8 U.S. Code § 1225—Inspection by Immigration Officers; Expedited Removal of Inadmissible 
Arriving Aliens; Referral for Hearing,” accessed January 25, 2015, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ 
text/8/1225. See also INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C § 125(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
37 “Immigration Court Practice Manual,” 1–258, June 2013, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPrac 
Manual/Practice_Manual_review.pdf.  
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Section 239(b)(1) of the INA provides that master calendar hearings must be scheduled 
within 10 days after the notice to appear (NTA) is served on the alien.38 A master 
calendar hearing is an initial court hearing to calendar submission dates for the asylum 
application and supporting documents, and to schedule the individual merits hearing. On 
occasion, applicants are not represented during the initial master calendar hearing and 
may not immediately find suitable legal representation for subsequent master calendar 
hearings. Therefore, immigration judges may reschedule additional master calendar 
hearings for the applicants to return with legal representation, which may be 30 or more 
days later. The applicants are, therefore, not immediately scheduled for their asylum 
hearings because they are given time to find and select an attorney to represent them at 
their master calendar hearing. The individual asylum hearing may be scheduled much 
later and, therefore, applicants have time to gather evidence and otherwise prepare for 
their individual hearings.39  
Since the court docket is severely backlogged, merits or individual hearings, 
during which the asylum case is fully presented, are scheduled far into the future. No 
regulatory requirement exists for a merits or individual hearing to be scheduled within a 
prescribed time. The scheduling of a merits or individual hearing depends entirely on the 
immigration judge’s calendar, attorney’s availability, and other such reasons, including 
timing needed to gather evidence, witnesses, or similar conditions. Therefore, the merits 
or individual hearing may be scheduled years later, which as explained in the following 
sections, may give the applicants additional time to polish their story. To not have the 
aliens linger in detention for many years, the aliens or someone on their behalf may post 
a monetary bond to release the aliens with the goal to ensure that they will return.40 
                                                 
38 “8 U.S. Code § 1229—Initiation of Removal Proceedings,” accessed January 25, 2015, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1229.  
39 “Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapter 4, Hearings before Immigration Judges,” June 2013, 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_review.pdf#page=67.  
40 “8 C.F.R. 212.5—Parole of Aliens into the United States,” accessed January 25, 2015, http://www. 
law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/8/212.5; 23 I&n Dec. 731 (Bia 2005), and Interim Decision #3510. In Re X-K-, 
Respondent. 
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C. THE CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEW 
The credible fear interview is recorded on “Form I-870, Record of 
Determination/Credible Fear Worksheet.”41 Prior to the interview, the asylum officer 
must ensure that the applicants have an understanding of the credible fear process. The 
applicants should have been oriented on the credible fear process during the 48 hours 
prior to the credible fear interview, which is evidenced by their signature and date on 
“Form M-444, Information about Credible Fear Interview.” Applicants, however, may 
waive the 48-hour waiting period and request to be interviewed as soon as possible.42  
D. WHAT HAPPENS DURING A SCREENING INTERVIEW? 
Whenever feasible, and at the discretion of an asylum office director, credible fear 
interviews are conducted in person, by telephone, or over live video conferencing 
equipment. The U.S. government will provide telephonic interpreters for applicants who 
do not speak English. These government-paid interpreters will translate verbatim what is 
being asked and answered during the interview.43  
The applicants may begin asking a series of questions, including how long they 
will be detained and when they can see family. Asylum officers, however, must first 
swear in the telephonic interpreters before swearing in the applicants to ensure that the 
oath the applicants take is clearly understood by the applicants. Only after explaining the 
purpose of the interview and ensuring throughout the interview that the applicants have a 
complete understanding of the process, may the asylum officer begin asking questions.  
Although it is not a requirement, credible fear applicants may be represented by 
an attorney, at no cost to the U.S. government during the interview.44 The credible fear 
                                                 
41 Cantor, Flynn, and Acer, “Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.” 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 César C. García Hernández, “No Right to Attorney for Credible Fear Interview, Says Immigration 
Judge,” crImmigration, November 25, 2014, http://crimmigration.com/2014/11/25/no-right-to-attorney-for-
credible-fear-interview-says-immigration-judge/. 
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interview is not adversarial; however, the applicants are sworn in to testify truthfully.45 
No witnesses are cross-examined, and applicants may submit. Occasionally, applicants 
will have witnesses, who may testify at the discretion of the asylum officer.46 
The asylum officer must type or handwrite notes of the interview and ask the 
applicants a series of questions, including names, aliases, date(s) of birth, country of 
origin, marital status, and similar.47 After the initial questions, the asylum officer seeks to 
learn about the applicants’ claims to fear and harm, including why the applicants left their 
countries and who they feared.48 The asylum officer will probe applicants’ reasons for 
fear, focusing on details about any particular event that caused the applicants to leave his 
or her country. The asylum officer will also ask questions to ascertain whether the 
applicants have persecuted anyone or are somehow barred from asylum. Before the end 
of the interview, the asylum officer must read back the testimony of the applicants. At the 
end of the interview, applicants are informed that a determination on the credible fear 
application will be served at a later date.  
The supervisory asylum officer may review all cases; although certain high 
profile determinations are referred for review to the Headquarters Asylum Office. 
Positive or negative decisions are handed to the applicants in person.49 On occasion, 
when applicants are interviewed over the phone or over video conferencing equipment, 
detention center staff will usually facilitate the process and help the asylum office staff 
with handing the decision to the applicants. 
Pursuant to INA section 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), negative determinations contested 
by the applicants must “be concluded as expeditiously as possible,” which is understood 
to mean within 24 hours but no later than seven days after the date of the negative 
                                                 
45 “8 C.F.R. 208.30—Credible Fear Determinations Involving Stowaways and Applicants for 
Admission Found Inadmissible Pursuant to Section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7) of the Act,” accessed January 
25, 2015, http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/8/208.30.  





determination.50 Contested negative determinations may be reviewed by an immigration 
judge conducting credible fear interviews of the applicants. The immigration court may 
vacate the adverse determination and find that the applicants shall have an opportunity to 
apply for asylum.51 
E. THE FIVE GROUNDS OF PERSECUTION  
The United States recognizes five grounds of persecution under which a person 
outside their country of origin and fearful of return may be granted protection.52 These 




 membership in a particular social group 
 political opinion53  
Any claim for protection not based on one of the five protected grounds, even if 
the person faces potential harm, does not establish eligibility under asylum law. Others 
also are barred from eligibility. They include anyone who has persecuted, threatened or 
harmed someone’s life and freedom, certain criminals, or those who are a danger to the 
security of the United States, even if they fear for their own safety on account of one or 
more of the above grounds of persecution.54 
INA section 101(a)(42) provides that an applicant must establish a nexus to one of 
the protected five grounds and that the persecutors were or would be motivated to harm 
                                                 
50 See INA section 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III). 
51 “8 C.F.R. 1003.42—Review of Credible Fear Determination,” accessed January 25, 2015, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/8/1003.42.  
52 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” December 2010, http://www.unhcr. 
org/3b66c2aa10.html.  
53 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. section 1101, 
Pub. Law No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 309 (1996), codified at 8 U.S.C. section 1101. INA section 235(b)(1)(A) 
and 8 C.F.R. section 235.3. 
54 “Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate Officer Training. Asylum Division 




the applicants by at least one of these central reasons.55 Although an exact motive is not 
required, the persecutors must be influenced by the protected characteristic in targeting 
the applicants. Race, religion, nationality, and political opinion have a long history and 
are relatively easy as a basis for persecution. Membership in a particular social group, 
however, is somewhat amorphous and its meaning continues to evolve with new cases 
and experiences. For instance, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) recognized 
domestic violence as a protected ground on August 26, 2014.56 A claim that rests on fear 
of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group requires an asylum 
officer to apply analytical tests that have been defined by case law in evaluating the 
applicants’ claim for asylum. These carefully carved out interpretations of what 
constitutes a membership in a particular social group do not include civil strife, fear of 
gangs, or gang violence, forced gang membership, economic reasons, or similar harm 
unless the harm is severe and “above and beyond” economic deprivation.57 However, 
harm not associated with the five protected grounds does not preclude a finding of fear of 
harm on account of a protected ground on which the persecutors’ motives are mixed, 
such as the persecutors are motivated to harm for economic reasons and political 
reasons.58  
F. CREDIBILITY ISSUES  
Credible, persuasive testimony that refers to specific facts is sufficient for 
applicants to meet the threshold of establishing that they have a well-founded fear of 
returning to their countries of origin. To meet the legal standard of a well-founded fear, 
                                                 
55 See INA sections 101(a)(42) and 208(b)(1)(B)(i). 
56 Matter of A-R-C-G- et al., 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). 
57 “Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate Officer Training. Asylum Division 
Officer Training Course—Asylum Eligibility Part I: Definition of Refugee; Definition of Persecution; 
Eligibility Based on Past Persecution,” March 25, 2009, http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ 
Humanitarian/Refugees & Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC Lesson Plans/Definition-Refugee-Persecution-
Eligibiity-31aug10.pdf.  
58 Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
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the applicants must demonstrate that they have both a subjective and an objective fear.59 
Subjective fear means that the applicants have an awareness of the danger. It recognizes 
that fear is evidence of risk perceived at an individualistic level, and requires the 
evaluation of the applicants’ testimony in light of the political and social conditions in 
their countries of origin. When subjective fear is not established, the request for 
protection must be denied. Subjective fear is negated, for instance, when the applicants’ 
account of fear is not credible or when the applicants return to their countries of origin 
after having made a claim of fear of persecution. When applicants establish subjective 
fear, the asylum officer examines the applicants’ fear against an objective standard and 
whether future persecution is likely to occur. The objective standard was explained by the 
Supreme Court in its 1987 landmark decision INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987).60 The 
Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca also emphasized a low threshold level of 10 percent 
for applicants to establish a well-founded fear. The applicants meet the standard if a 
reasonable person in similar circumstances would fear persecution, and if a reasonable 
person would fear harm upon returning to the countries of origin.61 Further, in Matter of 
Mogharrabi, the BIA found that the applicants, to establish objective fear, must provide 
credible, direct, and specific evidence.62 
In practice, when the asylum officer discovers an adverse credibility factor during 
the interview, the officer must inform the applicants of the inconsistency and provide the 
applicants with an opportunity to explain the inconsistency.63 Minor inconsistencies do 
not negatively impact a credibility finding by the asylum officer. An officer may find the 
applicants not credible when the inconsistency is material to the claim; for example, the 
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63 United States General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed 
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identity of the persecutor or other key points in the claim cannot be remembered during 
the interview or in follow-up interviews. Vague testimony or one that lacks the details 
that the applicants should generally be able to provide will support an adverse credibility 
finding.64 
Revisions to the Asylum Office’s lesson plan on credible fear require asylum 
officers to review applicants’ statements to CBP. If the initial statements made to the 
CBP officer contradict the statements to the asylum officer, the asylum officer must 
inform the applicants and assess their credibility. Additionally, the REAL ID Act of 2005 
modified asylum law provisions pertaining to credibility.65 Under the REAL ID Act, the 
interviewing officer considers the totality of the circumstances when assessing the 
credibility of applicants.66 The officer will consider the applicants’ demeanor, 
responsiveness to questions, and whether they are detailed in their answers to questions.67 
In applying the REAL ID Act, the officer no longer has to consider whether an 
inconsistency goes to the heart of the claim. Trivial inconsistencies or inconsequential 
ones for which the applicants offer plausible explanations do not support an adverse 
credibility finding. However, substantial inconsistencies or omissions result in negative 
determinations. 
G. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM AND DE NOVO HEARING  
When the asylum officer does not find asylum applicants eligible for asylum, and 
these individuals have legal status in the United States (e.g., as a visitor or student), the 
applicants will receive a notice of intent to deny which explains the asylum officer’s 
reasons for the action.68 The applicants have 16 days to respond and rebut the notice of 
intent to deny. They must explain the reasons why they should receive asylum or submit 
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evidence previously unavailable.69 Based on the rebuttal, the asylum office will make a 
final decision to approve or deny the asylum application. 
However, when asylum applicants are not in valid status, for example, because 
the applicants’ nonimmigrant status has expired, they were never in a lawful status, or 
otherwise lost their lawful status, and the asylum officer denied the asylum application, 
then the case is forwarded or referred to the immigration court that has jurisdiction to 
hear the case. The asylum applicants will have an opportunity to present their case anew 
before an immigration judge. In a de novo hearing, the applicants may present new 
evidence, bring in witnesses, and depending on the circumstances, potentially add new 
reasons for asylum.70 A de novo hearing treats the case as if it had not been previously 
heard or adjudicated. It is essentially a second chance to get the asylum story right. 
H. DEFENSIVE ASYLUM AND DE NOVO HEARING  
Immigration judges also conduct de novo hearings for credible fear applicants 
who contest negative credible fear determinations.71 These credible fear de novo hearings 
are not asylum hearings. Although immigration judges make independent findings during 
these de novo hearings, the record will contain a summary of the credible fear interview 
conducted by the asylum officer, including any evidence or facts the officer relied upon, 
as well as the officer’s notes and assessment.72  
I. TERMINATION OF ASYLUM 
INA section 208(c)(2) governs the termination of asylum status under certain 
circumstances. A grant of asylum may be terminated upon discovery that an applicant 
obtained a grant of asylum through fraud.73 When fraud in asylum is suspected, the 
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asylum officer must first establish that the applicant knew that the statement or document 
was fraudulent.74 The asylum officer may also terminate an individual’s asylum status if 
her or she returned to the country in which persecution was experiences, or no longer has 
a well-founded fear of persecution and/or the country’s conditions have changed.75 
Termination of asylum status makes individuals subject to removal proceedings. 
Although the asylum officer may terminate asylum status for individuals who 
avail themselves of the protection of the countries of feared persecution (e.g., by 
returning to those countries or obtaining permanent resident status in those countries), the 
asylum officer has no jurisdiction to terminate asylum grants by immigration judges.76  
J. AGENCIES INVOLVED 
Numerous agencies are involved in the credible fear and asylum process, both 
from DHS and DOJ. Although other agencies exist, the following is a discussion and 
overview of the most visible agencies and their responsibilities.  
1. United States Customs and Border Protection  
With more than 60,000 employees, CBP is DHS’s principal law enforcement arm. 
Its top priority is to guard the border and provide border security, which is to prevent 
illegal entries and foil terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States.77 
CBP guards 328 ports of entries and 15 pre-clearance locations, and secures over 5,000 
miles of a border the United States shares with Canada and nearly 2,000 miles of land 
border the United States shares with Mexico. CBP also patrols approximately 95,000 
miles of U.S. coastline and a network of rivers along the borders. In 2013, Congress 
authorized a CBP budget of $12,953,010,000.78  
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When CBP officers apprehend someone, they must create a record of the facts, 
which are documented on Forms I-867A&B, “Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings 
Section 235(b)(1) of the Act.” The CBP officer will read a series of questions to the 
aliens and record the responses on Form I-867A&B. The aliens are required to initial 
each page and sign the form. At the same time, the aliens are informed of the charges and 
ordered removed. The removal order prohibits the aliens from reentering the United 
States for a period of five years. Additionally, they are not entitled to a hearing or appeal 
in the expedited removal process. Historically, Mexican nationals entering the United 
States are returned within 24 hours. Individuals from countries other than Mexico may 
linger in ICE detention as was discussed previously, or are released unless they fall into 
the civil immigration enforcement priorities categories.79 
CBP also creates Form I-213, “Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien,” in 
anticipation of removing the individuals from the United States. Form I-213 records the 
apprehended persons’ immigration history, such as apprehensions and removals, 
including any criminal records. 
2. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
ICE became DHS’s chief investigative agency for the country after it merged the 
investigative roles of the former U.S. Customs Service, the Federal Protective Service, 
and the INS. ICE has powers to investigate and apprehend aliens, detain suspected illegal 
entrants, and audit and search businesses that employ illegal aliens. The agency 
accomplishes its goals through two branches, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), 
ICE’s investigative arm, and Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), ICE’s 
operation that manages the country’s immigration detention system.80 
ICE’s Detention Management Division reports that as of November 2011, ICE 
has 33,330 beds available as compared to 7,500 beds in 1995, and houses men, women, 
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and families in its detention system.81 On October 6, 2009, ICE released a comprehensive 
study of its detention system conducted by the Office of Detention Policy and Planning 
within ICE. The report found that during FY2008, ICE had “378,582 aliens from 221 
countries in custody or supervised,” and detained 31,075 aliens spread over a network of 
more than 350 facilities throughout the United States, all of which was at a cost of 
$31,000,000.82 Detention facilities are generally operated by county authorities or private 
contractors and not by ICE employees, who are assigned to the various facilities. In 
recent months, ICE opened temporary detention facilities or converted jails to house new 
illegal arrivals to avoid having to release them into the United States where they may 
disappear into the immigrant communities.  
Roughly 66 percent of detainees were subject to mandatory detention because of 
criminal histories and confined in correctional facilities designed for pre-trial felons. Of 
the 51,000 detainees released from detention into the community in 2008, 12,000 were 
under an order of recognizance, 29,000 bonded out, 10,000 agreed to be supervised, and 
650 were paroled. ICE is responsible for ensuring that detainees are safe and secure, that 
the detention facilities provide sufficient physical space and are free of infectious 
diseases, and that if health issues arise, they are identified and handled. Detention officers 
(DO) meet with detainees at least once a week in person to discuss the removal process. 
According to the report, the average detention time is 30 days; however, most detainees 
are released within one day to four months. At any time, the detainees may request to be 
interviewed by an asylum officer.83  
Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. section 236.1, individuals in detention may either themselves 
or through another person or company post a bond to be released. The purpose of the 
bond is to increase the likelihood that individuals present themselves in any future 
immigration proceedings. If the aliens fail to appear at a future hearing, the money is 
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forfeited.84 Further, ICE may release individuals from detention under orders of 
supervision or monitor aliens with a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet.85 
Additionally, ICE’s Policy Directive (PD) provides that when arriving aliens 
indicate an intention to apply for asylum or a fear of persecution, an officer shall refer the 
aliens for an interview conducted by an asylum officer.86 Aliens who have established a 
credible fear of persecution may be paroled on a case-by-case basis for “urgent 
humanitarian reasons” or “significant public benefit,” provided that the aliens are neither 
a security risk nor a flight risk pursuant to 8 C.F.R. sections 212.5(b); 235.3(c).87  
Five categories of aliens may qualify under the case-by-case standard, provided 
they are not a security risk or a risk of absconding: (1) aliens who have serious medical 
conditions, (2) pregnant women, (3) certain juveniles, (4) aliens who are witnesses in 
federal judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings, and (5) aliens’ continued 
detention is not in the public interest.88 The officers are reminded that the directive serves 
as a guide, as parole is inherently discretionary. ICE also determines whether the aliens 
pose a danger to the community or are a risk to U.S. national security. Denied parole 
requests are in writing and state the reason(s) for the denial. When paroles are granted, 
the aliens are provided with a Form I-94 annotated with “Paroled under 8 C.F.R. section 
212.5(b). Employment Authorization Would Not to Be Provided on This Basis.”89  
Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson’s November 20, 2014 policy memorandum to ICE, 
CBP, and USCIS provides guidance for the apprehension, detention, and removal of 
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undocumented aliens in this country.90 The Secretary’s memo is effective as of January 5, 
2015, and gives, unless they qualify for asylum, the highest priority to aliens who should 
be removed who are a threat to national security, security to U.S. borders, and public 
safety. This category includes aggravated felons. Aliens fall in the other two enforcement 
priorities if they have been convicted of three or more misdemeanors other than traffic 
violations, or are immigration violators and should not be removed if they qualify for 
asylum.91 In considering the mandatory detention and priority of the removal of aliens 
housed in detention, the ICE field office director, CBP sector chief, or CBP director of 
field operation, should exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis and whether the aliens 
are an enforcement priority.92 
3. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services  
USCIS is DHS’s agency that manages immigration benefits of foreigners coming 
to the United States. USCIS has 223 offices around the world and 19,000 employees. A 
component of USCIS, the Refugee, Asylum and International Operations (RAIO) 
Directorate has three divisions: the Refugee Affairs Division, the Asylum Division, and 
the International Operations Division. Collectively, the divisions in RAIO fulfill the U.S.’ 
obligations under the 1967 Protocol of the United Nations by providing humanitarian 
services to those in need and protecting refugees and asylum applicants from serious 
harm.  
The Asylum Division has offices in Long Island, New York, Newark, New 
Jersey, Arlington, Virginia, Miami, Florida, Houston, Texas, Chicago, Illinois, Los 
Angeles, California, and San Francisco, California. Adjudication of credible fear cases 
and affirmative asylum cases is within the purview of the Asylum Division. Joseph 
Langlois is RAIO’s current associate director and was previously chief of the Asylum 
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Division within RAIO.93 The Asylum Division is responsible for conducting individual 
credible fear interviews, usually in-person or over video-conferencing equipment, with 
detainees who expressed a fear to return to their countries. The interview will determine 
whether the individual applicants have a credible fear and are otherwise admissible to the 
United States. As previously mentioned, the credible fear interview is a screening 
interview and once credible fear is found, the individuals may proceed to the next step 
and file an application for asylum with the immigration court. 
4. Executive Office of Immigration Review  
EOIR is an agency under DOJ and is charged with adjudicating immigration 
cases. For purposes of this thesis, the terms “immigration court” and “immigration 
judge,” either the singular or plural form, will include the term “EOIR.” EOIR has 60 
immigration courts and employs 248 immigration judges to conduct judicial hearings in 
matters of deportation and removal. A handful of those immigration judges reside over 
asylum claims that arose from favorable credible fear determination. Accordingly, 
approximately 408,037 cases are awaiting adjudication by the 248 immigration judges, or 
an average of 1,645 cases per judge.94 
With a backlog of approximately 408,037 cases in the immigration courts system, 
a case may linger for many years before applicants will receive a final decision on their 
asylum claim.95 From October 1, 2013 to August 1, 2014, TRAC Immigration reports 
that cases take an average processing time of 506 days to go through the immigration 
court system, which includes time for scheduling the initial hearing, to the merits hearing, 
all the way to the decision.96 However, the average wait time for individuals to be seen 
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by an immigration judge for the first time is approximately 567 days.97 In other words, 
more than a 1,000 days or nearly three years, have passed between the day of referral by 
the asylum office to the day of the decision by an immigration judge. The prolonged 
waiting periods may be a nuisance to some who desire finality in their lives, whereas they 
are a benefit to others because it allows them to rehearse their story and gather new 
evidence. Moreover, individuals will be permitted to remain in the United States. 
Understandably, the individuals will make the United States their home as others in this 
country, including working, living, marrying, having children, and similar, with the 
potential of being told at an immigration court hearing that the asylum claim is denied 
and the individuals are then removed.  
K. CREDIBLE FEAR APPLICANTS DEMOGRAPHICS 
By the third quarter in FY2014, the Asylum Division reports that it received 
35,333 applications and found 73 percent of them, or 26,723, to have demonstrated 
credible fear. The front runners for nationalities in cases in which fear was found were El 
Salvador with 9,688 cases, followed by Honduras with 4,259, Guatemala with 2,991; 
Ecuador with 2,918, Mexico with 2,052, China with 1,172, India with 698, Nicaragua 
with 448, Nepal with 281, Bangladesh with 419, Peru with 292, Somalia with 238, the 
Dominican Republic with 234, and Albania with 232. Other nationalities were 
represented at times with fewer than a hundred cases, including Syria with 63 approved 
credible fear cases, and Iraq with 27 approved credible fear cases. Detainees who filed 
credible fear applications in which no basis was found were determined not eligible for 
credible fear referral to the immigration court or requested to return to their home 
countries. In addition, 1,793 cases were dissolved and 18 cases were withdrawn by 
applicants, which equates to less than 5 percent of the applications filed during that 
period of time.98 Therefore, on average, applicants who request a credible fear interview 
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with an asylum officer have an 80 percent chance of getting approved, such as by being 
referred to immigration court.  
During FY2103, CBP apprehended 68,645 females and 345,752 males, or a total 
of 414,397 individuals at the southwest border; of those, 148,988 were nationals from 
counties other than Mexico.99 Although these numbers appear large, the United States 
saw a surge in applications during FY1999. During that fiscal year, approximately 
1,537,000 people were apprehended at the southwest border and 1,579,010 apprehensions 
occurred nationwide.100 At that time, the credible fear program already existed but was 
largely unknown and underused by the illegal population. 
Table 1, Apprehensions by CBP from FY1992 to FY2013, shows that more 
economic migrants were apprehended after the enactment of IIRIRA. Table 1 also shows 
a decline in the number of apprehensions since FY2008. 
Table 1.   Apprehensions by CBP from FY1992 to FY2013101 























FY2013 414,397 420,789 265,409 267,734 148,988 153,055 
FY2012 356,873 364,768 262,341 265,755 94,532 99,013 
FY2011 327,577 340,252 280,580 280,580 46,997 54,08 
FY2010 447,731 463,382 396,819 396,819 50,912 59,017 
FY2009 540,865 556,041 495,582 495,582 45,283 52,655 
FY2008 705,005 723,825 653,035 653,035 51,970 62,059 
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FY2013,” 2014, http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20 
Fiscal%20Year%20Apprehension%20Statistics%20by%20sector%20and%20border%20area.pdf. 
 33























FY2007 858,638 876,704 800,634 800,634 48,004 68,016 
FY2006 1,071,972 1,089,092 973,819 973,819 98,153 108,026 
FY2005 1,171,396 1,189,075 1,016,409 1,016,409 154,987 165,170 
FY2004 1,139,282 1,160,395 1,073,468 1,073,468 65,814 75,389 
FY2003 905,065 931,557 865,850 865,850 39,215 49,545 
FY2002 929,809 955,301 901,761 901,671 28,048 37,317 
FY2001 1,235,718 1,266,214 1,205,390 1,224,047 30,328 42,167 
FY2000 1,643,679 1,676,438 1,615,081 1,636,883 28,598 39,555 
FY1999 1,537,000 1,570,010 No data No data No data No data 
FY1998 1,516,680 1,555,776 No data No data No data No data 
FY1997 1,368,707 1,412,953 No data No data No data No data 
FY1996 1,507,020 1,549,876 No data No data No data No data 
FY1995 1,271,380 1,324,202 No data No data No data No data 
FY1994 979,101 1,031,668 No data No data No data No data 
FY1993 1,212,886 1,263,490 No data No data No data No data 
FY1992 1,145,574 1,199,560 No data No data No data No data 
 
1. Mexico  
Of the 641,633 individuals attempting to enter the United States illegally during 
the FY2011, 76 percent were Mexican nationals.102 Historically, few Mexican nationals 
have successfully established eligibility for asylum; however, this factoid may be 
changing with the recent rise of credible fear and asylum applicants from Mexico who are 
citing crime, and drug violence as a reason for fleeing, and with the possibility of 
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expanding the membership in a particular social group to include individuals who fear 
harm based on crime and violence.103  
Although Mexican nationals continue to make up only about 7 percent of all the 
credible fear cases, from FY2009 to FY2011, the number of Mexican nationals who 
applied under the credible fear program has increased fourfold.104 Moreover, over the 
same period of time, applicants’ chances of referral to immigration court increased from 
58 percent to 85 percent.105  
Therefore, the data shows that Mexican nationals are increasingly applying for 
credible fear and asylum in the United States. Moreover, while the United States is a 
destination country, most of the illegal population travels through Mexico, using 
smugglers and their routes. This situation was recognized by President Obama who 
reaffirmed his cooperation with his Mexican counterpart, President Peña Nieto, in 
addressing the surge of migrating Central Americans through Mexico.106  
2. El Salvador 
El Salvador has a population of more than 6.1 million people with approximately 
20 percent of its population living abroad.107 According to the 2010 census, 1,648,968 
Salvadorans live in the United States, with the largest communities living in California, 
Texas, New York, Virginia, and Maryland.108 In the last decade, CBP apprehended 
256,108 Salvadorans attempting to enter the United States illegally.109 
                                                 
103 Sandra Dibble, “Rising Numbers of Mexicans Seek Asylum,” U-T San Diego, March 12, 2014, 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/mar/12/mexican-asylum-seekers/. 
104 Asylum Abuse: Is It Overwhelming Our Borders? Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary 
House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 1st sess., Serial No. 113–56 (2013), https://www.hsdl. 
org/?view&did=748900. 
105 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Report to Congress—Detained Asylum Seekers for 
FY 2009 and 2010 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
foia/reports/detained-asylum-seekers2009-2010.pdf. 
106 “Credible Fear Workload Summary Report—FY2009–FY2014.” 
107 “The World Factbook: El Salvador,” Central Intelligence Agency, last updated June 22, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/es.html.  
108 Sharon R. Ennis, Merarys Ríos-Vargas, and Nora G. Albert, The Hispanic Population: 2010 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau, 
2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf.  
109 Dickson, “How the U.S. Sold Out Indian Asylum Seekers on the Border.” 
 35
Estimates in 2008 set the number of Salvadorans living in the United States 
illegally at 570,000, which makes it the second largest unauthorized immigrant group 
right after the illegal population from Mexico.110 In 2011, DHS revised its earlier figures 
and stated that the numbers of Salvadorans living illegally in the United States is 
approximately 660,000.111 This number represents an increase of approximately 16 
percent in only three years.  
Along with Salvadorans trying to escape violence and poverty in El Salvador, 
criminal elements arrive in the United States. The gangs Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, 
and Eighteen Street (M18), originated among Salvadorans living in the Los Angeles area 
during the 1980s. With illegal criminal aliens being deported back to El Salvador, the 
gangs have spread their violence throughout Central America.112 Concern exists that 
gang members are using the credible fear process to come to the United States.113 The 
Department of State (hereinafter simply referred to as DOS) issues travel warnings for 
U.S. citizens traveling to El Salvador that state that families of gang members are being 
threatened, killed, or disappear.114 
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DHS reports that from 2002 to 2011, 296,551 nationals from Honduras were 
apprehended.115 In 2008, approximately 300,000 Hondurans represented nearly 26 
percent of the entire unauthorized immigrant population.116  
DOS published travel warnings on January 9, 2015 that Honduras has had the 
highest murder rate in the world since 2010, that violence and crime rates have been 
critically high throughout the country, and that the government is unable to protect its 
citizens.117  
In June 2014, Honduras began a three-prong campaign to stop illegal migration to 
the United States. The campaign delivers CBP ads in Spanish warning of the dangers of 
traveling through Mexico and that travelers will not be awarded with immigration 
benefits. Additionally, the Honduran government will repatriate Honduran nationals who 
were removed from the United States and apprehend those who illegally cross the border 
into Guatemala from Honduras.118  
4. Guatemala 
In 2008, 430,000 Guatemalan nationals were living illegally in the United States, 
who account for 27 percent of the illegal population for the entire United States.119 The 
recent surge of illegal entrants from Central American countries increased the credible 
fear claims. According to the 2014 Ombudsman’s report to Congress, Guatemalan 
nationals were the third highest group to apply for credible fear during the FY2013.120 
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From 2002 to 2011, ICE found 76,975 nationals of the People’s Republic of 
China inadmissible to the United States, with 22,446 attempting to enter the United States 
illegally.121 Over a period of nine years, from FY2002 to FY2011, the Asylum Division 
approved the asylum applications of 26,261 Chinese nationals. Those individuals 
accounted for about 20 percent of all the approved asylum applicants in the United States, 
whereas an immigration judge defensively approved the asylum applications of 37,155 
Chinese nationals.122 These figures are in contrast with the number of asylum 
applications approved for Chinese nationals during the FY2013, the year China became 
the country with the highest number of affirmative asylum applications.123 In FY2013, 
4,072 Chinese nationals or 27 percent of all applicants had their asylum applications 
approved. Thus, with 4,532 applications or 46 percent, China was also the leading 
country for filing defensive asylum applications.124  
6. India  
During FY2008, approximately 160,000 Indian nationals illegally lived in the 
United States and made up roughly less than 10 percent of the unauthorized immigrant 
population in the country.125 Often, economic migrants from India are paying as much as 
$35,000 to be smuggled across the border into the United States, whereas some Indian 
nationals report smugglers demand $50,000.126 
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The United States fully complies with international treaties on issues relating to 
alien smuggling and trafficking, and is actively working with national and international 
groups to eliminate smuggling and the trafficking of humans. Still, the people, who are 
being smuggled to the United States, are paying anywhere from a few thousand dollars 
upward to $60,000 to be smuggled into the United States.127  
L. EVIDENCE/DATA FROM USCIS’ ASYLUM DIVISION  
Over the past five years, the Asylum Division saw a dramatic shift in the number 
of credible fear applicants. As Figure 1 illustrates, the trend began in FY2009 with 5,522 
credible fear referrals from ICE to USCIS, and has been steadily increasing to the 
present. The Asylum Division reports that it received no fewer than 7,848 credible fear 
applications during FY2010 and 33,283 credible fear applications during FY2013.128  
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Table 2 illustrates that historically only a small percentage of individuals subject 
to expedited removal proceedings requested credible fear interviews. However, the same 
table also shows that the number of individuals interviewed increased from 2006 to 2011 
by more than 200 percent. 
Table 2.   Individuals subject to expedited removal referred for a credible fear interview, 
2006–2011 
Year Subject to Expedited 
Removal¹ 




2006 116,001 5,338 5% 
2007 111,448 5,252 5% 
2008 117,711 4,995 4% 
2009 111,394 5,369 5% 
2010 120,075 8,959 7% 
2011 Not provided 11,217 Not provided 
¹ Numbers of individuals subject to expedited removal are calculated from the numbers of individuals removed through 
expedited removal and individuals referred to a credible fear interview. Note that the numbers of individuals who 
withdrew their applications for admission in lieu of expedited removal were unavailable for FY2006–FY2011. The total 
numbers of individuals subject to expedited removal are preliminary figures. 
² Statistics from the Asylum Headquarters Asylum Pre-Screening System (APSS) database.  
 
Table 2 must also be read in conjunction with Table 3 to understand that the 
increase in credible fear applications results in an increase in finding credible fear 
eligibility. Table 3 confirms the concerns of the legal community, and also shows that of 





Table 3.   Credible fear claimants who meet the credible fear standard130 
Credible Fear Cases FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011
Referrals from CBP or ICE 5,338 5,252 4,995 5,369 8,959 11,217
Completed 5,241 5,286 4,828 5,222 8,777 11,529
Credible fear found 3,320 3,182 3,097 3,411 6,293 9,423
Credible fear not found 584 1,062 816 1,004 1,404 1,054
Closed 1,337 1,042 915 807 1,080 1,052
Of cases decided on the 
merits, % where credible fear 
was found 85.04% 74.98% 79.15% 77.26% 81.76% 89.94%
Of all referred cases, % 
where credible fear was 
found 63.35% 60.20% 64.15% 65.32% 71.70% 81.73%
 
As the chances of an approval of the credible fear application are greatly 
enhanced, more and more individuals in expedited removal proceedings are willing to 
await their credible fear interview to move on to the next step in this process. 
Additionally, the chances of obtaining approval for their credible fear interviews works 
as an incentive for individuals who have no fear of returning to their countries and file 
frivolous claims of fear, as applicants who have been determined to have no fear, or those 
who misrepresented themselves or their claim, are not penalized for having submitted a 
credible fear application despite statutory and regulatory provisions to the contrary. The 
individuals are simply returned to their countries of origin unless the individuals contest 
the denied credible fear application to be seen by an immigration judge on this matter. 
The question becomes what is the reason for the 80 percent approval rating of credible 
fear cases?  
 
                                                 




From March 2013 to June 2013, the Asylum Division accepted 15,579 new 
affirmative asylum applications and had 26,386 applications pending at the end of June 
2013. Of the 8,878 cases adjudicated, the Asylum Division approved 4,155 applications. 
During the same four-month time frame, the Asylum Division revoked 12 asylum 
grants.131 The Asylum Division did not provide reasons for the revocations or 
information about when the individuals were granted asylum prior to the revocation. 
What is clear, however, is that less than .3 percent of cases approved are ultimately 
revoked despite the high fraud rate. 
M. EVIDENCE/DATA FROM CBP AND ICE  
When CBP determines that non-citizens at the border are not clearly admissible, 
and unless the non-citizens have requested asylum, the officer may temporarily detain 
them for further inquiry, and under INA section 235(b)(1)(A), has the authority to 
summarily remove these individuals.132 On October 1, 2014, CBP published a 
breakdown of its enforcement actions by state along the U.S. southwest border for 
FY1960 to FY2014. As noted in Table 4, apprehensions in Texas accounted for more 
than half of CBP’s total apprehensions during FY2013 and nearly 70 percent of CBP’s 
total apprehensions in FY2014.133 Apprehensions during FY2013 at the southwest border 
accounted for nearly 98.5 percent of the nationwide total of 420,789 apprehensions in 
FY2013. In other words, only 6,392 individuals were apprehended at the northern border 
or coastal border sectors.134 The numbers of people apprehended by CBP during FY2013 
and FY2014, as shown in Table 4, demonstrates that apprehensions at the southwest 
border are significantly larger than throughout the rest of the nation.  
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Table 4.   Apprehensions by CBP by state135 
Apprehensions Arizona Texas New Mexico California Total  
FY2013 125,942 235,567 7,983 44,905 414,397 
FY2014 93,817 337,036 4,096 44,422 479,371 
 
Table 5 documents the number of apprehensions by ICE, both HSI and ERO, and 
CBP from FY2009 to FY2013. Moreover, Table 5 shows CBP and ICE agencies 
apprehended 25 percent fewer illegal border crossers in FY2013 than they did in 
FY2009; yet, the number of individuals who took advantage of the credible fear process 
in detention increased sevenfold during that same period of time as previously discussed. 
The numbers, therefore, only support a finding that the southwest border faced a crisis 
not previously experienced by the nation. The data captured in Table 5 does not include 
FY2014 apprehension by ICE, as they have not yet been published at the time of this 
writing. 
Table 5.   Aliens apprehended by agency from FY2009 to FY2013 (includes 
administrative arrests)136 
Apprehensions FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
By CBP 556,032 463,382 340,252 364,788 420,789 
By HSI (ICE) 21,251 18,290 16,261 15,937 11,996 
By ERO (ICE) 311,920 314,915 322,093 290,602 229,698 
ICE Total 333,171 333,205 338,354 306,539 241,694 
Combined Total 889,203 796,587 678,606 671,327 662,483 
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The information in Table 6 captures ICE removals for FY2009 to FY2014 and 
includes the removals of convicted criminals and non-criminal immigration violators.137 
Table 6.   ICE total removals FY2009 to FY2014138 
 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 
Convicted 
Criminals 




253,491 197,090 180,208 174,880 151,834 137,983 
Total 389,834 392,862 296,906 366,292 368,644 315,943 
 
The data in Table 6, therefore, indicates that more individuals were removed 
during FY2014 than in FY2009. Yet, fewer non-criminals were removed than criminals. 
Moreover, the above data are contrasted with the data shown in Table 5. Table 5 shows 
that in FY2009, ICE apprehended a total of 333,171 individuals, as compared to 
conducting 241,694 apprehensions in FY2014, which represents a decrease in the number 
of individuals apprehended by ICE of nearly 28 percent. Yet, ICE only removed 389,834 
immigration violators in FY2009, and removed 315,943 violators in FY2014, which 
indicates a decrease of approximately 20 percent in the number of individuals removed 
from the United States by ICE. 
Table 7 describes the average length of stay in ICE detention. During FY2012, 
detainees were staying in detention an average of 26.5 days or nearly 10 days less, or 
approximately 72 percent fewer days than during FY2007, which shows foreign nationals 
were detained an average of 37.2 days in detention during FY2007. Detention stays for 
convicted criminals dropped from an average of 47.5 days in FY2007 to 32.5 days in 
FY2012, which indicates a 71.25 percent decrease in the number of days. Length of stays 
also became shorter for the non-criminal population, which dropped about 63 percent. 
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Table 7.   Average length of stay in days as of August 25, 2012139 
 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
Convicted Criminals 47.5 44.0 41.0 36.6 34.7 32.5 
Non-Criminal 
Immigration Violators 
32.0 24.3 25.8 25.9 22.7 20.1 
Total 37.2 30.4 31.3 31.5 29.2 26.5 
 
Whether the reduced length of stay in detention correlates with the decline in the 
number of removals of immigration violators, or the increase in asylum and credible fear 
cases, is not readily clear from the data. However, a September 11, 2014 article by Dara 
Lind on deportations questioned the reliability of the number of deportations by ICE. She 
referred to an AP report that the number of individuals deported by ICE between October 
1, 2013 and July 28, 2014 was 258,608 or 862 per day.140 Ms. Lind is disputing a 
September 11, 2014 report, entitled “U.S. Sharply Cutting Deportations,” by the 
Associated Press by Alicia Caldwell, who wrote that ICE deported 20 percent fewer 
illegals during this budget year than the previous year, when it removed 320,167 
individuals.141 Ms. Caldwell emphasized that ICE deported 344,624 people from October 
1, 2011 to end of July 2012, whereas ICE reports, on its website that it removed 366,292 
individuals during FY2012, which ended September 30, 2012. While ICE’s numbers and 
the ones used by Ms. Caldwell may not necessarily contradict each other, the data show 
that the numbers of individuals removed have decreased while the numbers of 
immigration violators have not waned.  
Notwithstanding the high numbers of apprehension and removal, detention has a 
human component, as Arjun Sethi, writer for the Christian Science Monitor, noted on 
June 5, 2012 that “it’s not fair” to hold asylum seekers at the border in expedited removal 
proceedings indefinitely. At the time, detention cost U.S. taxpayers about $100 per day 
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per detainee.142 Since 2012, the cost of housing a detainee rose to approximately $159 
per day during FY2014.143 Actual expenses, however, may be much higher. 
Table 8 shows the average daily detention population as of August 25, 2012 
leveled at about 34,069.144  
Table 8.   Average daily population as of August 25, 2012145 
 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 
Total 30,295 31,771 32,098 30,885 30,330 34,069 
 
In his report on detaining credible fear applicants, which was based on data 
gleaned from a 2004 Census Bureau study, Steven Camarota, the Director of the Center 
for Immigration Studies, remarked that the costs associated with illegal immigration run 
into the billions.146 Camarota found that a single individual in expedited removal 
proceedings costs U.S. taxpayers $100 per day per alien.147 The daily costs for detaining 
illegal border crossers jumped to about $163 in 2013.148 Contrary to these figures, DHS 
estimated the average detention cost to be about $119 per day.149 Therefore, according to 
the data in FY2012, the United States expends anywhere between $4 million to $5.5 
million dollars per day on detaining immigration violators. 
142 Arjun Sethi, “Don’t Penalize Asylum-seekers at U.S. Ports,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 
5, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0605/Don-t-penalize-asylum-seekers-at-
US-ports.  
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idUSBRE92001120130301.  
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To alleviate the agency of costs associated with the apprehension, detention, and 
processing of illegal border crossers, ICE announced a new policy of automatically 
considering releasing individuals, who have established a credible fear, from detention 
pursuant to parole.150 Additionally, despite having been issued notices to appear, which 
clearly provide the reason(s) for the hearing, and the location, dates and times of the 
hearing, many credible fear applicants are not reporting to their mandatory immigration 
court hearings. To keep track of released aliens, ICE began using ankle bracelets in 
December 2014 to monitor individuals it released on bond.151 However, no reliable 
statistics of the success of this program are currently available. 
N. EVIDENCE/DATA FROM EOIR  
The Office of Immigration Statistics within DHS reports that for FY2002 to 
FY2012, 143,104 individuals were granted their affirmative asylum application by the 
Asylum Division, whereas 117,847 individuals were granted their defensive asylum 
applications by the immigration courts.152  
Table 9 shows all the types of cases that the immigration courts received between 
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Table 9.   Immigration court cases received by case type153 
Type of Case FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 
Deportation 68 77 76 5 1 
Exclusion 9 13 4 1 0 
Removal 254,460 246,214 237,478 211,193 187,677
Credible Fear Review 861 1,144 885 739 1,768 
Reasonable Fear Review 229 387 441 815 1,162 
Claimed Status 41 47 26 37 31 
Asylum Only 404 383 407 355 394 
Rescission 46 48 49 25 46 
Continued Detention Review 1 1 5 2 0 
NACARA (Nicaraguan Adjustment 
and Central American Relief Act) 19 4 1 0 2 
Withholding Only 240 497 886 1,090 2,269 
Total 256,378 248,815 240,258 214,262 193,350
 
The statistics in Table 9 show rescissions or terminations of defensively filed 
asylum cases in immigration court. Given that fraud in asylum filings constitute on 
average 70 percent, the number of cases terminated in immigration court is low, and on 
average, only 11 percent of the asylum cases received. Despite the high level of fraud, as 
previously indicated, the immigration courts rescind only a handful of credible fear and 
asylum cases, even if fraud was later discovered in the application or some other reason 
that made the individuals no longer eligible for asylum status. This denial results because 
immigration judges generally only have an opportunity to terminate individuals’ asylum 
status when they are placed in proceedings because of having committed a crime. Once in 
proceedings, the applicants may still be eligible for certain other immigration benefits 
unless the government or ICE attorney can demonstrate that the original asylum 
application was frivolous not because the applicants no longer fear returning to their 
countries of origin.  
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O. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In June 2014, President Obama requested a multi-agency response to the crises at 
the border.154 The President directed the DHS Secretary to call upon the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in coordination with the military, DOS, and 
other agencies for a unified approach to alleviate the humanitarian crises.155 The 
Secretary designated FEMA to manage the government-wide response with 140 
interagency personnel to provide relief in the form of housing, language services, food, 
and other basic necessities to the illegal border arrivals.156  
As the Asylum Division experienced a sevenfold increase in credible fear claims, 
and moved staff and resources away from the asylum program, the President’s plan 
entailed hiring additional asylum officers to conduct credible fear interviews and 
temporarily assign immigration judges to conduct hearings over video conferencing 
equipment.157 Additionally, the President announced a Central American Regional 
Security Initiative (CARSI) at a cost of $165.1 million dollars to stem illegal immigration 
from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. When Congress denied the President’s 
request for a $3.7 billion emergency immigration fund to handle the high number of 
illegal arrivals, DHS moved funds to support the agency’s efforts.158 On January 9, 2015, 
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the Congressional Appropriations Committee voted to increase DHS’s budget by $400 
million to $39.7 billion in discretionary funding.159 
The concerns about managing the flow of undocumented arrivals are not merely 
limited to an increased budget. On June 11, 2014, immigrant advocacy groups filed 116 
complaints against DHS, and alleged that 80 percent of the unaccompanied minors were 
neglected, did not receive food or water, and were being emotionally, verbally, and 
physically abused, including subjected to rape and beatings while in custody.160 When 
DHS launched a federal investigation into the first batch of allegations of systemic abuse 
that included 57 surprise visits to 41 border patrol facilities, no misconduct was found. 
The Inspector General John Roth declined to prosecute due to a lack of criminal 
activities.161  
Aside from the concern for abuse of the foreign population in detention, some 
advocates call for the release of individuals from detention while they are waiting for 
their asylum court hearing because of the high costs associated with housing these 
individuals. Detaining the hundreds of thousands of individuals could cost the country 
billions of dollars.162  
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III. GAPS IN THE CREDIBLE FEAR AND ASYLUM PROCESS  
A. CHANGE IS NEEDED IN THE CREDIBLE FEAR AND ASYLUM 
PROCESS 
The UNHCR reported on March 27, 2012 that the United States, with an 
estimated 74,000 claims, ranks as the country with the highest number of asylum 
applications in 2011 among the 44 countries covered by the report.163 The Office of 
Immigration Statistics Annual Flow Report published by DHS showed that nearly half of 
all of the defensive asylum applicants (those that are in proceedings) are from China, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nepal, and Egypt with the majority of applicants being younger than 24 
years of age.164 The Pew Hispanic Center, a project of the Pew Research Center, 
analyzed a Census Bureau data study from 2011, and estimated that approximately “11 
million unauthorized” were in the United States.165 
During the spring, and particularly during the summer of 2013, the number of 
people arriving at the southwestern border between the United States and Mexico who 
requested credible fear interviews dramatically increased, with Texas reporting nearly a 
quarter million apprehensions.166 “Credible fear” applications at the border have 
increased sevenfold, from just under 5,000 to more than 36,000, driven largely by an 
influx of economic migrants coming from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.”167 
While ultimately most applicants will not be granted asylum, the credible fear process 
buys time as approximately 80 percent of credible fear applicants are referred to an 
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immigration judge. Since the system is backlogged, this process allows credible fear 
applicants to live in the United States for years before actually being seen by an 
immigration judge. 
On May 22, 2013, the Judiciary Committee and the Committee on Oversight 
Government Reform held a hearing on S.744 and the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, during which current and former ICE officials and private security 
contracting firms testified about detention facilities, fraud by applicants in the expedited 
removal process [credible fear process], and border security issues.168 Subsequent 
hearings revealed that during FY2013, credible fear applications grew by 434 percent.169 
At the time of the hearing, approximately 28,679 credible fear applicants had appeared 
since the beginning of FY2013, which constitutes approximately two-thirds of all 
applications interviewed by asylum officers. The committee also learned that no agency 
is keeping track of individuals who return to their countries after they receive asylum 
approval on the basis that they are afraid to return these countries.170  
Members of the Congressional Committee on Border Security Oversight visited 
the U.S.-Mexico border near Yuma and Nogales, Arizona, and the detention centers in 
Eloy, Arizona. Mr. Jason Chaffetz, who chaired the hearing, noted that the increase in the 
number of credible fear applicants is a serious flaw in the U.S. legal system, as it exposes 
weaknesses in this nation’s immigration systems and is the newest emerging threat. He 
was dismayed by the situation of the immigration court in Phoenix, Arizona, staffed with 
only three immigration judges who had calendared a court date in 2020 for a credible fear 
applicant because of the overwhelming number of credible fear claims.171  
On July 18, 2014, a press release from Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob 
Goodlatte revealed, “the vast majority of Central Americans arriving at our border come 
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to meet up with another family member who is already in the United States illegally.”172 
Chairman Goodlatte’s statement alludes to the primary reason for applicants leaving their 
countries, which may not be because they are fleeing harm but rather to be with family 
members living in the United States, some of whom may be undocumented aliens. In 
contrast, the American Immigration Council countered on September 14, 2014 that 
politicians are using the credible fear process for political gains, by alleging “people are 
abusing the system.” Attorneys Sara Campos and Joan Friedland quote RAIO Associate 
Director Joseph Langlois’ conclusion that two-thirds of credible fear claims were filed by 
individuals fleeing “increased drug trafficking, violence and overall rising crime” in El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.173  
However, as already previously stated, general violence and crime are not 
grounds for asylum, and individuals who claim fear solely on the basis of crime may be 
removed from the United States. To avoid deportation, many applicants who initially 
stated that they fled criminal gangs and violence at time of the credible fear interview 
change their story when they apply for asylum to meet a ground for protection (e.g., fear 
of persecution because of political opinion), and hope they will be assessed a favorable 
outcome.  
Examples of news items that contribute to the public’s loss of trust in the U.S. 
asylum system are concerns that the immigration authorities are releasing criminal aliens 
or absconders from custody.174 ICE is charged with detaining apprehended illegal aliens 
housed in facilities run by county authorities or private contractors.175 However, during 
the spring of 2013, ICE released 2,228 illegal aliens from detention because it had no 
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room in its detention centers.176 Additionally, in November 2013, the Judiciary 
Committee indicated that it obtained an internal CBP document that many people 
claiming a “credible fear” of persecution have a direct or indirect association with drug 
trafficking and other illegal activity, such as human smuggling.177 Laura Wides-Munoz 
of the Associated Press reported a typical example when she wrote on August 11, 2014 
that the illegal mother of a teenager in Honduras had sent money for her to be smuggled 
to the United States to be reunited with her.178  
What is disconcerting are reports of illegal aliens who are terrorists with gang 
member associations in Mexico and other South and Central American countries, and 
who are infiltrating the Spanish-speaking Muslim communities in those countries. 
Reports from federal agency officials and several authors have come to the forefront and 
reported that “terrorist groups seek target-rich environments for financial support, safe 
haven, and recruitment,” and that “six million Muslims inhabit Latin American cities, 
which are ideal centers for recruiting and hiding terrorists.”179 On July 22, 2010, the 
subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 111th Congress, found that smuggling 
pipelines could potentially be exploited by terrorist and other extremist organizations 
seeking entry into the United States.180 Despite these concerns, DHS, as reported by FOX 
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News, found no evidence that Mexican gangs were aligning themselves with terrorists to 
be smuggled across the southwest border.181 
B. GAPS OF FRAUD IN THE CREDIBLE FEAR AND ASYLUM PROCESS 
A noted authority in the field of refugee and migration law, Professor James C. 
Hathaway defines refugees as involuntary migrants and includes, “victims of 
fundamental social disfranchisement” in this definition.182 “Victims of fundamental 
social disfranchisement” are not classified as refugees under the 1967 Convention. 
Individuals, who fear harm or suffered harm, must connect the harm to one of the refugee 
definitions (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion). Professor Hathaway criticizes the Convention definition as inadequate 
because it does not capture harm of individuals who suffer “fundamental social 
disfranchisement” because of economic discrimination or lack of access to education or 
health care.183 To extend sanctuary to migrants who seek economic security under the 
Convention, however, goes beyond the definition of membership in a particular social 
group. Concern about financial status or lack of opportunity may create fear and anxiety 
in people; nonetheless, economic status is not an immutable characteristic, and in fact, is 
changeable. Still, it is worth repeating that the United Nation charter protects only those 
who suffered or fear serious human rights violations in their home countries; therefore, 
economic migrants are not included in the refugee category unless the economic harm, 
depending on the circumstances, affects the person’s livelihood.184 Extending the 
definition of membership in a particular social group to include economic migrants or 
those who are victims of disfranchisement may have unintended consequences. Aside 
from the possibility that social disfranchisement may dilute the proof of harm applicants 
are required to show, it would open up additional avenues for individuals with little to no 
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harm to misrepresent or exaggerate their claims of harm. Therefore, the Asylum Division 
or the immigration courts may incur an accompanying difficulty when determining what 
circumstances reach the level of economic harm that would require protection.  
Moreover, Professor Hathaway recognizes that “refugees are entitled to protection 
against refoulement,” which precludes signatories to the United Nation charter from 
removing refugees to the countries of fear. However, he also proposes to withdraw 
refugee status when the risk of harm ends.185 The prohibition against refoulement, such 
as to not return individuals to countries in which their life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of one of the five protected grounds, is an important consideration 
under the 1967 Protocol.186 Approved asylum status, however, should be terminated 
when the individuals present a danger to the security of the country, or return to the 
countries of claimed fear or again avail themselves of the protection of the home 
countries. Re-availment includes, depending under the circumstances, voluntarily 
applying for or obtaining a national passport.187 Such action would, under Professor 
Hathaway’s definition, arguably show that the risk of harm the individuals feared ended. 
Accordingly, the UNHCR suggests that contracting countries should reinvestigate the 
claim for asylum, and ask the people to explain, “that there has been no basic change in 
the conditions that originally” made them seek protection.188  
As already described under the Credibility discussion in Chapter II.F., applicants 
only need to meet a 10 percent threshold to establish that they have a well-founded fear, 
which will require an asylum officer to find the applicants established credible fear, if in 
expedited removal proceedings, or an asylum application was approved during the 
affirmative process. Due to the low threshold level of proof required, fraud is rampant in 
the credible fear process.  
The congressional committee on Border Security Oversight held several hearings 
during late 2013, and January and February 2014, and recently announced that more than 
                                                 





70 percent of the credible fear applications are fraudulent.189 During the February 11, 
2014 hearing on asylum fraud, Professor Jan C. Ting emphasized, “illegal immigrants … 
have a strong incentive to lie in making an asylum claim in order to obtain permanent 
legal status to work legally and qualify for becoming a U.S. citizen.”190 During the 
hearing, Professor Ting provided several examples of individuals who obtained their 
asylum status in the United States by telling fraudulent stories. He also cited a New 
Yorker article from August 1, 2011 called “The Asylum Seeker,” which describes “how 
illegal immigrants educate themselves on how to construct stories that make them sound 
like victims of persecution” when, in fact, they had never been harmed or embellish their 
fear.191 At 70 percent, the success rate of a false claim being approved is better than 
winning the lottery, and as Professor Ting pointed out, it is difficult to expose fraudulent 
claims and secure convictions. Illegal immigrants have found the credible fear route 
attractive and the number of credible fear applications has “increased sevenfold from less 
than 5,000 [in 2008] to more than 36,000 in FY2013.”192 
Similar to the examples given by Professor Ting, earlier in 2014, illegal 
immigrants were found with a “cheat sheet” in the Spanish language near the Mexican 
border close to McAllen, Texas.193 The cheat sheet lists routine questions asked by 
immigration officials of illegal aliens and typical answers to these questions. In the 
asylum context, as previously explained, similar narratives are not necessarily indicative 
of fraudulent claims. Moreover, some scholars may interpret the cheat sheet as an item of 
evidence that the individuals were informed of their rights and the type of questions they 
may be asked by an asylum officer. Further, as already stated earlier, USCIS maintains a 
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website that explains the credible fear screening process and how individuals may qualify 
for protection under this program. Still, it is believed that the cheat sheet was used to 
coach illegals to fabricate claims that they fled violence and feared returning to their 
home countries.194 As is explained more fully in subsequent sections, irrespective of the 
divergent views on the cheat sheet, such evidence supports a need for a change in the 
credible fear and asylum process, including additional reviews even after an approval of 
asylum status. 
Mr. Sekutu Mehta, the author of “The Asylum Seeker,” which appeared in the 
August 1, 2011, issue of the New Yorker, and who was quoted by Professor Ting during 
the February 11, 2014 hearing on Asylum Fraud, was immediately criticized for his 
article. Although fraud is found in 70 percent of credible fear claims, Anna 
Theofilopulou’s decries Metha in her article, “Most Asylum Seekers Are Not 
Cheaters.”195 Similar outcries perpetuate that fraud is a myth in the asylum process. 
A September 26, 2014, article, entitled “U.S.: Most New Immigrant Families Fail 
to Report,” by Alicia A. Caldwell with the Associated Press details that “70 percent of 
immigrant families… did not follow the government’s instruction to meet with federal 
immigration agents within 15 days. Instead, they have vanished into the interior of the 
U.S.”196 Ms. Caldwell writes that the “70 percent figure suggests that roughly 41,000 
[individuals] failed to appear at federal immigration offices,” and that only 14 of the 860 
people ordered removed were actually deported.197 While House Judiciary Committee 
Bob Goodlatte criticized the Administration for the 70 percent no-show rate by illegals, 
no recommendation of how to mitigate these failures-to-report was forthcoming from 
lawmakers. 
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C. TERRORISTS ABUSE GAPS IN THE CREDIBLE FEAR AND ASYLUM 
PROCESS  
Although reports contest that terrorists would abuse the credible fear process, 
terrorists and individuals with ties to terrorism have used the credible fear process and the 
asylum process to enter the United States with the goal to do harm. Therefore, a sense of 
irony emerges that those individuals would abuse this humanitarian immigration benefit 
by alleging that they were the ones harmed.  
On the other hand, some scholars argue that terrorists forgo crossing the 
southwestern border, which they perceive as too risky, and instead, recruit from 
sympathizers within the United States to avoid detection.198 Although homegrown 
terrorist recruitment occurs, the evidence points also to foreign-born terrorists using the 
U.S. asylum system to enter the United States. 
1. Lack of Available Research 
Kathleen Smarick and Gary D. LaFree of the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland conducted 
research on individuals in the United States who have been identified, indicted, charged, 
or prosecuted with federal terrorism-related activities. The research covered the period 
from 1980 to 2004, and showed involvement by those individuals in groups, such as the 
Abu Nidal Organization, Al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups listed on the 
U.S. DOS’ designated foreign terrorist organizations list.199 As the Smarick-LaFree 
research focused on the years from 1980 to 2004, information has been sorely lacking on 
this topic since then. No similar studies have been performed that would cover the past 
decade.  
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In their Final Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and 
Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the authors identified 
264 individuals charged with terrorism from 1980 to 2004 who entered the United States 
221 times. The report highlighted that these individuals relied on the political asylum 
mechanism to enter and remain in the United States, who used “fake or fraudulently 
obtained documents to enter the country.”200  
2. Yousef, Sheikh, Abdel-Rahmen, Tizegha, Siraj, and Abdi Cases 
Despite the lack of a more recent study on this topic, some cases are noteworthy. 
Ramzi Yousef’s case, for instance, claimed fear when he arrived in New York, which led 
him to be released from detention to commit the first World Trade Center bombing. 
Yousef was given two life sentences for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, a plot to 
assassinate Pope John Paul II, and plans to bomb Philippine passenger airlines and crash 
one of the aircrafts into CIA headquarters.201 Yousef, a Kuwaiti citizen born to Pakistani-
Palestinian parents, entered the United States on September 1, 1991, with an Iraqi 
passport and a false name. He was held for 72 hours during which time he requested 
political asylum, stating that he would be killed if he returned to Iraq.202 Due to a lack of 
bed space in the detention center, Yousef was released and referred to a November 9, 
1992 immigration court hearing.203 Once released, Yousef went on to mastermind the 
1993 World Trade Center attack.204 Equally worrisome is the September 3, 2014, capture 
of four terrorists from Turkey, who were smuggled across the border into Texas after 
                                                 
200 Smarick and LaFree, Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Lessons for 
Protecting against Dangerous Entrants, Final Report to the Office of University Programs, 23. 
201 John J. Lumpkin, “Project Bojinka,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed October 22, 2014, http://www. 
globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/project_bojinka.htm.  
202 Samuel M. Katz, Relentless Pursuit. The DDS and the Manhunt for the Al-Qaeda Terrorists (New 
York: Foge Book, 2002), 65–66. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Review of Department of Justice Immigration Detention Policies, Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
107th Cong., 1st sess., (2001), 12–22, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju76810.000/ 
hju76810_0f.htm.  
 61
each paid $8,000 to an unknown smuggler.205 The men stated they wanted to apply for 
asylum. Although these men were linked to a terrorist group that took responsibility for a 
suicide bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, a judge ordered two of the 
men released.206  
Other cases demonstrate the link between the credible fear process, asylum, and 
terrorists abusing the asylum process. For instance, Sheikh Abdel-Rahman, better known 
as the “blind Sheikh,” initially entered the United States on a tourist visa and lied to 
obtain permanent residency privileges. Then, after his green card was revoked, he 
requested political asylum.207 The Sheikh was given a life sentence for his involvement 
in the World Trade Center 1993 bombings.208  
Abdel Hakim Tizegha, another Al-Qaeda conspirator, also filed a claim for 
political asylum after he slipped across the Quebec-Vermont border in 1997.209 Ahmed 
Ressam, the Al-Qaeda-trained Millennium bomber, used a fraudulent passport and hid his 
true identity from customs officials.210 Although he was arrested, he was released after 
stating he was seeking political asylum. Ressam was later again arrested for skipping his 
immigration court hearing.211 Shahawar Matin Siraj applied for asylum after his arrest in 
connection with plans to bomb a New York subway station.212 Likewise, Nuradin M. 
Abdi illegally entered the United States and filed a frivolous asylum application to 
remain in the United States. Abdi was sentenced in 2007 to 10 years in prison for 
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conspiracy to provide material support to Al-Qaeda for plans to bomb a shopping mall in 
Ohio.213 
Other than the Siraj and Abdi cases, all these individuals share in common that 
they were known to the 9/11 Commission and abused the asylum process.214 
Additionally, Janice L. Kephart, Former Staff Counsel for the 9/11 Commission, stated in 
a joint commission hearing on March 14, 2005 before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Border Security and Citizenship, and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and 
Homeland Security, that asylum is “most rampantly abused by terrorists” and that 
“members of… terror groups have all used claims of political asylum to stay longer in the 
United States.”215 Although these cases and experts’ statements about the asylum-
terrorist connection pre-date the 9/11 events, asylum fraud by terrorists continues to this 
date as the following case discussions show. 
3. The Fahti’s Case  
The Fahti case demonstrates the ease of creating an asylum story and weaving it 
with facts gleaned from human rights reports, published by DOS. El Mehdi Semlali Fahti, 
a Moroccan man, entered the United States with a student visa on January 8, 2008. 
Although his student status terminated on February 20, 2009, he did not leave the United 
States.216 On December 19, 2010, he was arrested in Fairfax, Virginia for trespassing, 
and because he was no longer in valid student status, was referred to ICE’s ERO, which 
determined his removability and placed him in immigration custody.217  
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During his stay in detention, Fahti learned from another detainee how to apply for 
asylum. Fahti later admitted that, while he was in detention, he read country condition 
reports on human rights for Morocco published by DOS and used certain facts in those 
reports to create his case around those issues. He fabricated a story that the Moroccan 
government persecuted him because of his political opinion and would continue to do so 
if he were to be returned to Morocco. He claimed to have been a member of an anti-
government student union and that the Moroccan government suspected him of seeking 
to overthrow the monarchy. Later, he added fraudulent statements that he had been 
arrested and beaten by the Moroccan authorities.218 After filing an application for asylum 
with the immigration court and scheduling his next hearing, on June 27, 2011, Fahti was 
released from custody. While he was waiting to be scheduled for a merits hearing, he 
traveled to California and was arrested for theft on December 6, 2012.219 Fahti’s merits 
hearing was held on August 16, 2013, three years after he was found to have credible fear 
and was released from ICE detention. During his hearing, he provided detailed statements 
about his asylum claim, which at times, contradicted his written statements and the 
statements made in the asylum application. Nonetheless, he was granted withholding of 
removal, and subsequently, released from custody.220 After his release, a federal criminal 
investigation discovered that Fahti planned to bomb a federal building and an institution 
in Connecticut. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Fahti plead guilty to having abused the 
asylum process and was sentenced to two years in prison.221  
Lessons learned from the Fahti case are as follows. 
 Fathi learned about the asylum process from other detainees while he was 
in immigration custody. 
 Fathi researched human rights and country condition reports to fabricate 
his narrative and prepare his asylum application. 
 Fahti’s frivolous asylum application was only discovered after an 
investigation by federal law enforcement. 
                                                 





 Fathi was released from ICE detention because he had established he had a 
credible fear of return to Morocco. 
 Fathi was not removed from the United States despite his arrests and was 
granted withholding of removal; a right that allows him to remain in the 
United States. 
 Fathi was released from ICE detention and had three years to prepare for 
his asylum hearing. 
 Fathi plotted terrorist activities during the three years he was not in 
detention. 
It is presumed that Fathi underwent a thorough background search, which 
includes biographic and biometric searches, at the time he applied for his student visa, at 
the time he was arrested after his student status terminated, at the time he applied for his 
credible fear interview, at the time he was re-arrested for trespassing, and at the time he 
applied for his asylum application. The Fathi case demonstrates the ease with which 
individuals may apply for asylum even though the claims of fear are fabricated. 
Moreover, it demonstrates that despite criminal records, the asylum applicants may be 
permitted to remain in the United States and not be removed. More importantly, the case 
shows that the meritless claim of fear was only discovered through Fathi’s own 
testimony. The inconsistencies in his initial application became apparent during the 
merits hearing. Therefore, the Fathi case validates the recommendation to uncover fraud 
through several interviews and not to rely merely on the credible fear and asylum 
interviews.  
4. The Dhakane Case 
The Dhakane case shows that terrorists are learning about smuggling 
opportunities into the United States across the southwest border and to file frivolous 
credible fear and asylum applications. Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane, a Somali national, 
presented himself on March 28, 2008 to U.S. Border Patrol at the Brownsville POE in the 
southern district of Texas. Dhakane stated that he feared persecution in Somalia.222 After 
a brief stay in the Pearsall detention facility, on October 28, 2008, he applied for asylum 
that was initiated through the credible fear process. After his asylum application was 
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approved, he admitted to material falsehoods in his asylum application. He told federal 
agents about his association with a U.S.-designated terrorist organization and that he had 
illegally smuggled Somali nationals with terrorist ties into the United States.223 Dhakane 
was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on April 28, 2011 because he had given false 
information on his asylum application, and he had run “a large-scale smuggling 
enterprise” in Brazil prior to his entry to the United States, which included instructions to 
several violent Jihadists from Somalia of how to make false asylum claims.224  
The Dhakane case is important for several reasons. It demonstrates that Dhakane 
was in detention for 6 months, and during that time, subjected to thorough background 
investigations. Despite these background searches that aim to discover any reason that 
Dhakane should be barred, and include checks on criminal history or involvement with 
terrorists, he was approved in his credible fear interview and his asylum application was 
also approved. Only after his asylum application was approved, did Dhakane admit to his 
involvement with terrorism. Similarly to the Fathi case, the lesson learned from the 
Dhakane case is that background searches insufficiently protect the public and the United 
States from potential terrorists.  
The Fathi and Dhakane cases also illustrate that terrorism charges in credible fear 
and asylum cases may either not be filed, dropped, or plead down because they are 
difficult to sustain. The reason is not quite clear, and this author suspects that procedural 
and substantive reasons inherent in the legal process in combination with policy 
considerations are, at least, partially contributing to not pursuing terrorism charges. 
Another important point to draw from the Dhakane case is that it is not an isolated case. 
The lesson learned from these cases is that the abuse of the credible fear process by 
terrorists is not merely an idea. It is plausible with real implications.  
                                                 
223 “United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane, Defendant. U.S. District 
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224 Ibid. 
 66
5. The Boston Marathon Bombers  
Another unfortunate terror plot that shook the United States occurred on April 15, 
2013 when Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and his young brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, killed three 
and injured 264 people during the Boston Marathon.225 The Boston case illustrates that 
individuals who have approved asylum status return to their countries of fear yet federal 
officials rarely terminate or rescind approved asylum status on this basis. The Boston 
Globe reports that “1,582 asylum grants [or] less than 1 percent of roughly 300,000” 
asylum approvals during 1994 were revoked.226 Although the statistics quoted by The 
Boston Globe was compiled from data collected during the pre-9/11 era, the federal 
government, as previously discussed, continues to revoke few approved asylum 
applications even when the applicants return to the countries of fear.  
In the Boston Marathon bombing case, the two brothers received their asylum 
status in 2003, after the creation of DHS, through their father, Anzor Tsarnaev, when they 
were still minors.227 Due to confidentiality and practical reasons, children and spouses of 
asylum applicants are not screened on claims of persecution made by the primary 
applicant.228 According to the INA, within one year of arrival, the Tsarnaevs were 
permitted to apply for lawful permanent resident status.229 At that stage, the Tsarnaev 
brothers most certainly were too young to undergo biometric and background checks; 
however, they were screened on later occasions when they applied for other immigration 
benefits, including their naturalization application.230  
                                                 
225 Deborah Kotz, “Number Injured in Marathon Bombing Revised Downward to 264,” The Boston 
Globe, April 24, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/04/23/number-injured-
marathon-bombing-revised-downward/NRpaz5mmvGquP7KMA6XsIK/story.html.  
226 Maria Scacetti, “In Wake of Marathon Attack, Questions about Safe Harbor for Ibragim 
Todashev,” The Boston Globe, July 5, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/07/04/wake-
marathon-attack-questions-about-safe-harbor-for-ibragim-todashev/iTe3zMwBZxh46u9l5N2SWL/ 
story.html.  
227 “Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to April 15, 2013, Boston 
Marathon Bombings,” April 10, 2014, http://cdn1.bostonmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/s 
1404.pdf.  
228 “8 C.F.R. 1003.42—Review of Credible Fear Determination.” 
229 Ibid. 
230 Philip Bump, “How the Boston Bombing Suspect Became a U.S. Citizen,” The Wire, April 19, 
2013, http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/04/how-boston-bombing-suspects-became-us-citizens/64397/.  
 67
The Tsarnaev are ethnical Chechens who lived in Dagestan, a Russian province 
near Chechnya, and although Anzor Tsarnaev claimed persecution in Chechnya, the 
evidence is murky if they have actually ever lived in Chechnya and rather shows that he 
and his family had lived in Kazakhstan before moving to Dagestan.231 Further, Anzor 
Tsarnaev returned to live in Dagestan, which certainly negates his fear of returning to live 
in that country, and his sons traveled to Russia, Dagestan, and Chechnya to join jihadist 
groups.232 Ironically, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev became a naturalized citizen on September 11, 
2013, the 12th anniversary of 9/11.233 
One year after receiving asylum approval, the Tsarnaevs applied for permanent 
resident status and later for naturalization to become U.S. citizens.234 Although the 
Tsarnaevs’ background checks revealed “no derogatory information,” and that processes 
were followed and benefits were granted, “in accordance with the … INA and agency 
and policy procedures,” the evidence points to the fact that Anzor should not have had his 
asylum, and subsequent immigration benefit applications, approved because of suspect 
travel to the country of fear.235 Aside from the problematic travel pattern, this case also 
raises the questions of why asylum status is so quickly approved for individuals on whom 
scant information is available, and why those approved asylum applicants should be 
eligible to apply for lawful permanent resident status after only one year. 
6. Terrorists Planning to Enter the United States?  
In February 2014, Miriam Jordan with the Wall Street Journal noted that Syrians, 
unable to secure a U.S. tourist visa, are traveling to Mexico to forego traditional channels 
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and enter the United States to apply for asylum.236 The obvious reason for this 
phenomenon, as the article pointed out, is that asylum is a fast track to obtaining LPR 
status.237 Figure 2 shows the number of Syrians and Iraqis who claimed credible fear to 
qualify for asylum in the United States during FY2010. The Wall Street Journal used 
figures obtained from DHS, and although Figure 2 shows 94 percent of Syrians were 
approved, USCIS also published its own figures and declares that only 78 percent of the 
Syrian applicants had their credible fear applications approved.238 The variance in the 
percentage and numbers of applicants should be contributed to the fact that the Wall 
Street Journal article appeared a few months after USCIS published its numbers, which 
may have increased by the time of the Wall Street Journal publication. 
 
Figure 2.  Credible fear applications from Syria and Iraq239 
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The Economist reported on June 14, 2014 that the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Greater Syria (ISIS or ISIL) has an estimated 11,000 Jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq, 
and that after ISIS took over Mosul, Iraq, half a million people fled the area.240 As of 
August 2014, the civil war contributed to more than three million Syrian displaced 
people.241 On November 25, 2014, just before Thanksgiving, the United Nations revised 
this number and announced that 12.2 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian aid.242 
As Jihadists in terror groups, such as Al Qaeda, Al-Nusra Front, and ISIS, have made 
Syria their home, the likelihood of terrorists trying to use the credible fear route through 
Mexico into the United States becomes more likely. Adding to the discourse, Texas 
Governor Rick Perry suggested during an interview that terror groups, such as ISIS, may 
already be in the United States.243  
On August 29, 2014, Andrew C. McCarthy from National Review Online writes 
that federal law enforcement is on alert because social media chatter indicates that ISIS is 
at the Mexican border planning an attack on U.S. soil.244 On the same day, a Texas law 
enforcement bulletin stated that ISIS is “expressing an increased interest in the notion 
that they could clandestinely infiltrate the southwest border of [the] U.S., for terror 
attacks.”245  
During a September 10, 2014 hearing on cyber security and terrorism, Under 
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Francis X. Taylor confirmed to the U.S. Senate 
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Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affair that ISIS has been 
encouraging followers through Twitter and other social media messages to infiltrate into 
the United States through the southwest border.246 DHS Secretary Jeh C. Johnson 
testified on September 17, 2014 at a hearing before the House Committee on Homeland 
Security that no evidence exists of ISIL attempting to infiltrate the United States through 
the southwest border and dismissed these announcements.247  
It is worth repeating that not every person who enters the United States illegally is 
seeking to harm the United States. Nonetheless, it is equally true that every individual 
who illegally crosses into the United States and asks for protection disrupts the integrity 
of the credible fear and asylum process. Therefore, the federal government should have 
additional safeguards in place when individuals are applying for protection from 
persecution. 
D. CRIMINALS ABUSE GAPS IN THE CREDIBLE FEAR AND ASYLUM 
PROCESS 
The discourse of abuse of the credible fear process by criminals also stirs up 
discussions. In particular, public outcry and concern has occurred over the number of 
criminal aliens released from detention prior to obtaining an asylum hearing. Although 
INA section 235(b)(1)(A) provides that credible fear applicants “shall be detained for 
further consideration of the application for asylum” after an asylum officer determined 
that aliens have a credible fear of persecution, CNN reported on February 28, 2013 that 
ICE released several hundred illegal immigrants from detention due to budget cuts 
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restraints.248 The released detainees were described as “non-criminals” or “low-risk 
offenders,” who would be required to wear ankle bracelets and be monitored.249  
Despite congressional intent to detain credible fear applicants until adjudication of 
the asylum application, 8 C.F.R. section 208.30(f) authorizes the consideration of parole 
after a positive credible fear finding (e.g., release from detention), for these applicants.250 
Then, in February 2013, former ICE Director John Morton took the interpretation of who 
should be released from detention a step further when he stated, “not all immigrants, even 
if they have committed crimes, are subject to mandatory detention… [and that] it’s not so 
different from how individuals are charged with crimes can be released on bail.”251 
During a House Judiciary Committee hearing on March 19, 2014, Rep. Bob Goodlatte 
(R-Va.) suggested for the former ICE director to request additional appropriations to 
avoid having to release illegal detainees. The ICE director, however, countered that he 
was “trying to live within the appropriations that Congress gives us.”252 The director’s 
explanation, however, seems circular. The director would not have to release detainees if 
the appropriations that Congress already gave to ICE were sufficiently high.  
Rightly so, the public is cognizant that more credible fear applicants are released 
from ICE detention than are detained. The use of administrative detention as a deterrence 
for individuals to discourage them from illegally entering the United States is not 
effective because detainees are asking to be released and are routinely released from 
detention. The following table, reproduced as Figure 3 illustrates ICE’s report to 
Congress on the number of asylum applicants in detention as compared to the number of 
detainees released from detention for the years 2006 to 2012. Year 2011, however, was 
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not reported. According to the table, 85 percent of asylum applicants were released from 
detention in 2006 as compared to 15 percent detained during that same year. In contrast 
stand the 2012 numbers, which show that only 64.4 percent of asylum applicants were 
released as compared to 35.6 percent, who remained detained. For the period from 2006 
to 2012, the non-detained population grew by nearly 28 percent, whereas the detained 
population grew by more than 76 percent.  
 
Figure 3.  ICE HRIFA report to Congress253 
To address concerns of the public, one of the objectives announced by ICE in its 
Strategic Plan FY2010–2014 was to phase out the “catch and release” policy and under 
the “secure communities” program to remove aliens who pose “a risk to national security 
or public safety, including terrorists, gang members and convicted criminals.”254 Since 
November 20, 2014, DHS discontinued the secure communities program.255 On the same 
day, Secretary Jeh C. Johnson issued a memo entitled “Policies for the Apprehension, 
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Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants,” which outlines DHS’ 
enforcement priorities.256 ICE continues the authority to detain, and according to 
interpretation by ICE, has the discretion to release individuals for whom detention is not 
mandatory. Mandatory detention is reserved for suspected terrorists, violent criminals, or 
individuals removable on certain other criminal grounds. Even when individuals are not 
subject to mandatory detention, ICE has prosecutorial discretion to continue to detain 
individuals perceived as risk of flight. In its discretion, ICE may release a detainee upon 
payment of a bond of no less than $1,500, or release the individuals on conditional 
parole, when the inadmissible alien is found to have a credible fear of persecution or 
torture, or for urgent humanitarian reasons, or where detention of the aliens is not in the 
public interest.257 The Secretary of Homeland Security, however, must approve all such 
releases. In August 2014, however, it was confirmed that the ICE director, in fact, had 
released illegal immigrants with known criminal records.258 
On August 12, 2014, the Inspector General (IG) issued a report on the release of 
immigrant detainees by ICE and found fault with ICE’s inadequate planning of its needs 
and lack of communication with homeland security leadership. However, the IG also 
found that budgetary restrictions were partially to blame and recognized that an increase 
in apprehensions of illegals contributed to the release of more than 2,000 detainees, some 
of whom were individuals with known criminal records.259 
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As delineated in the previous discussion, the asylum and credible fear program is 
subject to abuse by individuals who illegally enter the United States to improve their 
socio-economic status or to meet family members already in the United States. The 
program is also easily exploitable by criminals and terrorists. The various agencies are 
attempting to handle the large number of illegal entrants coming to the United States, by 
either working with the particular countries of origin to return them or channeling them 
through the credible fear, and ultimately, the asylum process once the individual 
expressed fear of return. The data also shows that fraudulently filed applications continue 
to be filed in large numbers and approved by both the Asylum Division and the 
immigration courts. Moreover, the program remains susceptible to criminals and 
terrorists benefiting from shortcomings in the program despite background checks and 
biometric screenings, which are completed before interviews and the issuance of the 
asylum benefit. An ISIS recruiter, for example, wrote an on-line article over the 2015 
Valentine’s Day weekend, that Italy’s checkpoints, “even [if] partially exploited and 
developed strategically, pandemonium could be wrought in the southern European 
states.”260 ISIS, thus, recognizes that Europe’s immigration policies could be exploited. 
Moreover, the UNHCR noted that during 2014, Italy experienced a 64 percent spike in 
illegal immigration from Libya and Turkey, and that 70,000 more people illegally crossed 
the Mediterranean into southern Europe since 2011.261 On February 15, 2015, Italy’s 
Defense Minister Roberta Pinotti raised similar concerns that “the risk is imminent” 
because ISIS fighters are planning to enter Europe illegally from Libya into Italy  
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disguised as Syrian refugees.262 Therefore, the idea that terrorists could slip through the 
southwestern border unnoticed, and if apprehended, apply under the credible fear process 
for asylum status, is no longer far-fetched. At least one U.S. intelligence source 
commented that jihadists could hide amongst groups of Syrian refugees as “a means of 
bypassing tighter restriction that control traveling by aircraft.”263 Accordingly, some 
areas should be addressed, which would enhance the integrity of the credible fear and 
asylum process and restore public confidence in the program. 
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IV. FINDING A SOLUTION THROUGH POLICY CHANGES 
The author’s research reveals that the current literature does not address all the 
issues of a successful credible fear and asylum program. The recommendations made by 
the federal government and others are helpful; however, they do not address all the 
weaknesses in securing the program, despite technological advancements in conducting 
front-end background checks, from infiltration by terrorists, or criminals, or in subsiding 
frivolously filed applications. Therefore, a change is needed in the current system that 
would address the high level of fraud within the credible fear and asylum processes. The 
system should have the capabilities of not merely detecting fraud before and during the 
asylum interview, but also after the approval of a request for protection. 
Recommendations for policy reform include the following. 
(1) The creation of an Asylum Review Board (ARB) 
 Create an ARB that would track foreign travel of approved asylees. The 
ARB would also periodically review the approved asylum status to ensure 
the individuals continue to meet the refugee definition and have the 
authority to terminate approved asylum claims regardless of jurisdiction, 
e.g., cases approved at either the Asylum Division or the EOIR. 
(2) A change in the credible fear process referral procedure 
 The Asylum Division should retain jurisdiction over asylum claims by 
credible fear applicants rather than referring these cases to immigration 
court. Moreover, referrals of denied affirmative asylum applicants to 
immigration court should no longer be entitled to de novo hearings to free 
up the immigration courts and reduce the EOIR backlog. 
(3) The provision for conditional asylum grants 
 Eliminate the one-year period that would permit approved asylees to apply 
for permanent resident status (the “green card”) and create additional 
layers of security. Instead, a two-year conditional asylum approval period 
should be established.  
The following discussion provides a brief overview and examination into the 
strengths, potential challenges, and limits of each recommendation. 
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A. CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT ASYLUM REVIEW BOARD  
The first recommendation for reform to the credible fear and asylum process is 
the formation of an independent ARB. The ARB should be a separate entity independent 
of the Asylum Division because one of its purposes is to manage approved asylum grants 
as compared to adjudicating applications filed by asylum seekers, which is within the 
purview of the Asylum Division. The ARB should be staffed with immigration services 
officers who are specifically trained in immigration and nationality law and also receive 
training in asylum and refugee law alongside asylum and refugee officers. This training 
would ensure ARB officers have a complete understanding of the intricacies of asylum 
and refugee law and individuals’ claim of fear of persecution. Additionally, ARB officers 
should work closely with the Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) directorate 
in eradicating immigration fraud and other threats committed by individuals with 
approved asylum status.  
At this time, the Asylum Division conducts security and systems checks at the 
front-end of the credible fear and asylum application process. The Asylum Division 
screens for national security risks, egregious public safety concerns, fraud, or criminal 
history upon receipt of an application. Once adjudicated, an asylum claim is rarely 
revisited and the individuals can move onto the next stage in their immigration process.  
As previously mentioned, the 1967 Protocol permits countries to inquire into 
individuals’ behaviors after being granted asylum. Nonetheless, at this time, no process is 
in place for USCIS to conduct such inquiries until the filing of another application, such 
as the filing of an adjustment of status application for lawful permanent residency by the 
approved asylum applicant. Additionally, as was pointed out by congressional members 
and the Asylum Division, travel to return to the countries of fear is not tracked by any 
agency. Yet, it is a common occurrence after asylum status approval. Additional time is 
needed to review applicants’ travel pattern after an asylum grant. Reviews of travel 
patterns detect fraudulent applicants and would aid in uncovering criminal and terrorist 
schemes. The ARB would be the entity with the authorization to track and review travel 
patterns of individuals with approved asylum status. 
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As part of its authority, the ARB will ensure that applicants with asylum status, 
who return to their countries of fear, be it for vacation, family visits, or for other 
innocuous reason, have their asylum applications re-evaluated and, if warranted, have 
their asylum privileges terminated. Further, the ARB will periodically review cases of 
individuals granted asylum to determine if the applicants continue to meet eligibility 
criteria as permitted under the 1967 Protocol.  
Currently, the Asylum Division and the EOIR each have the authority to 
terminate asylum status granted under a host of circumstances delineated under INA 
section 208(c)(2).264 Although each has the authority to terminate an approved asylum 
grant, few cases are acted upon. Additionally, only the EOIR has the authority to 
terminate approved asylum cases that originated in immigration court.265 Recently, the 
BIA stated that the EOIR has no jurisdiction to review terminations by the Asylum 
Division.266 Consensus appears to be growing, however, that a termination of asylum 
privilege is appropriate when asylees are returning to the countries of origin unless the 
return is for a good cause.267  
The ARB should have the authority to terminate asylum status regardless of 
where the case originated. It should have the authority to issue NTAs, which initiate 
removal proceedings against the individuals whose asylum were terminated. 
A shift of having the ARB be responsible for terminating asylum cases that 
should not have been approved restores integrity to the asylum process. Moreover, it 
deters individuals from filing frivolous asylum applications. Costs may be associated 
with the training and salaries of ARB officers, etc.; however, the benefit of having such a 
review board in place would enhance the credible fear process and the asylum program. 
Additionally, the ARB’s authority would address the concern of the Border Security 
Oversight Committee that an agency (e.g., USCIS through the ARB), is keeping track of 
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approved asylum applicants who return to their countries after they claimed fear of 
returning. 
The Asylum Division is not self-funded. It relies on other USCIS divisions for its 
budget, whereas, other divisions are self-reliant and are receiving monies by charging 
fees for applications. Similarly, the ARB could have a self-sustaining budget and charge 
fees.  
Resistance to establishing an ARB is likely from nongovernmental organizations 
with a stake in immigration matters, immigration lawyers associations, charitable 
organizations, and other public and private immigration organizations. Applicants, they 
might argue, have rights attached to termination proceedings in court and they would be 
disadvantaged in an ARB hearing. However, in this proposal, ARB officers would 
receive training in asylum and humanitarian laws and procedures, and individuals may be 
represented during any ARB interview or proceedings, just as they would be in 
proceedings for other immigration benefits. 
B. ELIMINATION OF REFERRALS OF SUCCESSFUL CREDIBLE FEAR 
APPLICANTS TO EOIR AND ELIMINATION OF DE NOVO HEARINGS 
FOR UNSUCCESSFUL AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM APPLICANTS  
The second recommendation in support of reforming the credible fear process is 
the elimination of referrals of successful fear applicants by the Asylum Division to the 
EOIR. Under current procedures, once credible fear applicants establish a significant 
possibility that they would succeed with an asylum claim, they are referred to 
immigration court to apply for asylum. Successfully referred applicants have the 
opportunity to prepare for a full asylum hearing, which includes time to find legal 
representation, bring witnesses, and submit additional evidence in support of their asylum 
application. However, there should be no referrals to immigration court. Rather than 
referring cases to the EOIR, the Asylum Division should retain jurisdiction over 
applicants’ cases and adjudicate asylum applications filed by individuals who 
successfully established a credible fear.  
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This process already partially exists. Unlike asylum applications filed by adult 
applicants, the Asylum Division has jurisdiction over claims filed by unaccompanied 
minors who illegally entered the United States. When minors are in removal proceedings 
and raise a claim of fear, immigration judges administratively close the removal 
proceedings and refer those cases back to the Asylum Division for adjudication. It is, 
therefore, plausible for the Asylum Division to similarly absorb the adjudication of 
asylum applications filed by adults after a positive credible fear determination. Moreover, 
shifting the burden of adjudicating asylum claims from the immigration courts to the 
Asylum Division would reduce the immigration court backlog by thousands of cases. The 
Asylum Division is presently prioritizing asylum interviews and is unable to provide 
exact hearing dates.268 However, waiting periods between the credible fear referral and 
the asylum interview would be considerably shorter than at the EOIR level.269 In January 
2015, TRAC Immigration reports the average wait period from referral to asylum hearing 
in immigration court is 594 days; whereas, average processing time (e.g., from filing the 
asylum application until the merits hearing), is 473 days.270 A change in the referral 
process would reduce the backlog at the EOIR. 
Moreover, as successful credible fear applicants are being released from 
detention, there are individuals who fail to appear for their asylum hearing in immigration 
court. Under the proposed procedure, applicants who fail to appear for their asylum 
interview with the Asylum Division should be referred to immigration court without an 
opportunity to apply for asylum at the court level unless rescheduling at the Asylum 
Division is warranted under the circumstances.  
                                                 
268 “How Long Does the Process Take?” February 4, 2015, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/ 
refugees-asylum/asylum/faq/how-long-does-process-take.  
269 “Asylum Office Workload (October, November, December 2014),” January 1, 2015, http://www. 
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED-AffirmativeAsylum-Oct-Nov-Dec2014.pdf.  
270 “Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration Courts,” 
January 2014, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/; “Immigration Court Processing 
Time by Outcome,” January 2015, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/court_proctime_ 
outcome.php. 
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A second component of the suggested changes to the referral process is the 
elimination of de novo hearings for affirmative asylum applicants who were found 
ineligible for a grant of asylum. 
As described previously, when applicants for affirmative asylum are unsuccessful, 
they are referred to immigration court. At that time, the immigration court has 
jurisdiction over the aliens’ asylum application and reviews the application as if an 
asylum interview with the Asylum Division had not taken place. Referrals should not 
provide the alien with “a second bite at the apple.” The purpose of a de novo hearing is 
for the immigration court to hear facts and evidence independent of the Asylum Division. 
However, as these hearings are scheduled years after the referral, they essentially permit 
the unsuccessful asylum applicants to correct their story. At this point, no other 
immigration application or petition would permit aliens to have a second chance, and the 
asylum applications should not be an exception. Unsuccessful asylum applicants should 
not have a second chance to rehearse their story to get it right. Rather, the immigration 
court should only review the Asylum Division’s decision to determine if gross errors 
occurred, such as in fact or in law, as is the case with other appealed applications and 
petitions. If the immigration court finds gross error, the case should be returned to the 
Asylum Division, as is the case with other applications and petitions remanded by the 
appeals offices.  
3. Provide for Conditional Asylum Status 
The third recommendation is to provide approved applicants with conditional 
rather than permanent asylum status. At present, once asylum is granted, applicants may 
reside in the United States permanently even after the conditions in their countries of 
origin that were the grounds for asylum have changed. As previously stated, once 
individuals’ asylum applications are approved, they may petition to bring their families, 
(e.g., spouse and minor children), to the United States as derivative asylees. Furthermore, 
after one year beyond the asylum approval, applicants and their family members may 
apply for lawful permanent resident status (i.e., the “green card”). This one-year period is 
an arbitrary period of time that should be lengthened to allow USCIS, through the ARB, 
to conduct further background checks.  
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The United States should consider a conditional asylum program that would allow 
persecuted individuals to feel safe in the United States and provide for their return once 
the threat is no longer viable. The concept of conditional status is not new. Prior to the 
enactment of the Real ID Act, section 101(g)(2), applicants from China who claimed 
persecution under China’s coerced population control policy were granted conditional 
asylum under a cap of a 1,000-person limit for this category.271 The concept of a 
conditional grant for certain asylum applicants was eliminated because it was dependent 
on the issuance of visas based on numerical limits. Other examples of conditional grants 
are available. For instance, USCIS grants conditional lawful permanent resident status 
(the “green card”) to aliens who marry United States citizens to ensure that the marriage 
is not based on fraud. Another example is conditional residency given to investors to 
ensure their investment complies with statutory and regulatory requirements, including 
the success of the enterprise venture and demonstration that the investor hires a certain 
number of U.S. workers. Conditional residencies for marriage-based and investor 
applicants run for two years. Prior to the expiration of the two years, the alien must 
present evidence that the marriage or the business continues to be viable.  
Similarly, the grant of asylum should be conditional. No numerical limits should 
be placed under the conditional asylum scheme (e.g., eligible applicants should be 
granted asylum once the condition is removed). However, the period before approved 
asylum applicants become eligible to file applications for lawful permanent residency 
should be extended to a minimum of two years to allow additional background checks of 
the applicants and their family members. Removal of the conditionality for approved 
asylees should also depend on a number of factors, including fraud and travel patterns, 
such as returning to the countries of fear during the period of the conditional asylum 
approval, criminal conduct, or other undesirable behavior. 
Extending the conditional time period creates several safeguards and restores 
integrity to the asylum system. The applicants, once asylum is conditionally granted, 
                                                 
271 Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers (CSR Order Code RL32621) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), 21, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL 
32621.pdf; “Text of the REAL ID Act of 2005,” accessed February 16, 2015, https://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bills/109/hr418/text. 
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must demonstrate that the condition should be removed by showing that the threat of 
harm that the individuals fear continues. Additionally, the time period would provide the 
ARB with an opportunity to vet the applicants and any family members appropriately, by 
reviewing backgrounds for unsavory acts, including crimes or involvement in national 
security matters, and inviting the applicants for brief, routine interviews to ensure that 
they continue to meet the definition of a refugee.  
During the period of conditional approval, individuals may apply for employment 
authorization and travel authorization to travel overseas. If evidence is available that the 
individuals or family members returned to the countries of fear, the ARB will be able to 
question the asylees on the reasons of returning to their countries, and as appropriate, 
initiate termination of asylum status procedure. Once the condition is removed, the 
applicants receive a final asylum approval and should be eligible to apply for lawful 
permanent residence within the prescribed period of one year.  
Conditional approval of asylum in the United States would also discourage 
approved asylees from returning to their countries of fear where they claimed to have 
faced fear of persecution, or to avail themselves of the benefits of their countries 
(including applying for a passport) while they also held a grant of asylum in the United 
States. These and other conditional requirements would substantially reduce the 
incentives to risk making a fraudulent claim to asylum.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
At the outset of this thesis, the plight of hundreds of thousands of displaced 
economic migrants and its implications for a dramatic increase in the number of credible 
fear filings and asylum applications was highlighted as a critical policy challenge for U.S. 
security. While some individuals have a genuine well-founded fear that meets the refugee 
definition under the 1967 Protocol, others also face valid fears that do not match the 
identified criteria. Additionally, some applicants are neither genuine asylum seekers nor 
fearful of returning to their home countries. Most of these individuals are merely seeking 
to make the United States their home, join family members who are already in the United 
States, or make a better life for themselves. By applying fraudulently, however, these 
individuals chip away at the integrity of the credible fear and the asylum program for 
those in need of protection. A broken application process also creates opportunities for 
criminals and terrorists to escape detection and apprehension.  
Due to the high level of fraud and abuse in the credible fear and asylum program, 
the thesis sought to answer the following critical questions: What weaknesses should be 
addressed to mitigate fraud and abuse in the system, and what solutions and 
recommendations should be formulated to minimize these gaps? 
Evidence was presented to demonstrate that the large number of credible fear and 
asylum applications has overwhelmed the system both at the Asylum Division and the 
EOIR. For several years before the influx of credible fear and asylum applicants began in 
mid-2012, the EOIR already experienced severe backlogs. Yet, the Asylum Division was 
unscathed for many years prior to the recent increase in applications. To reduce the 
increased workload, the Asylum Division hired additional staff to adjudicate cases. 
However, hiring additional staff has not fully addressed the symptoms.  
The primary reason to create an ARB is to provide a solution to correct 
deficiencies in the asylum and credible fear process. By serving as a mechanism to 
monitor approved asylum applicants, the ARB would help protect the United States from 
terrorism plots and attacks, deter fraudulent applications, and improve public safety, and 
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thereby, restore integrity to the system. The proposed Asylum Review Board would have 
the authority to address a range of vulnerabilities by managing approved asylum claims, 
terminating approved asylum claims if necessary, and in accordance with statutory and 
regulatory laws initiate removal proceedings. 
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